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ABSTRACT 
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is one of the few Indian political parties which 
contest nationwide. Its Hindu nationalistic appeal changed over time. In 1998, the BJP 
gained power and formed a coalition to rule India. Against some expectations, it did not 
transfer its Hindu nationalistic ideology into practice when it came to domestic and 
international politics. This thesis answers the question of which factors affected the 
behavior of the BJP and influenced the BJP’s policy. It argues that the BJP did not 
change its basic Hindu nationalistic character. It is still a political party with nationalistic 
party identity. But, political diversity of India led to an adjustment of enforceable 
political goals and the development of a flexible policy to gain political power. India’s 
federal system, in combination with the trend towards factionalism, led to the necessity of 
coalition building among political parties. Thus, even the BJP had to use tactical shifts to 
partly moderate its rhetoric, along with other strategies in different states, to build 
coalitions with different political parties. 
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a Hindu nationalist party in India. Upon 
formation in 1980, the party leadership tried to present the BJP as the democratic 
alternative to the Indian National Congress (INC) by focusing on issues which were 
historically on the INC’s agenda. Upon losing the elections of 1984, the BJP changed its 
course by focusing on and using Hindu nationalistic rhetoric. The BJP began Hindu 
religious and nationalistic agitation and started the Ayodhya campaign that led to the 
demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992. In the aftermath of the demolition of the Babri 
mosque, riots between Muslims and Hindus occurred across the country. As a result, 
more then 2,000 people were killed. The riots resulting from the events in Ayodhya 
began a phase of increasing tensions between Hindus and Muslims in India which may 
still be seen today. However, shortly after the riots of 1992, the BJP changed its course 
towards more moderate politics. Consequently, in 1998, the BJP won 182 out of 545 
seats in the Lok Sabha and was able to form a government at the center as part of a 
coalition. After the election of 1999, where the BJP won 284 out of 543 seats, the BJP 
was able to form a stable coalition which lasted until 2004. 
The BJP’s changing strategy and platform before 2004 illustrates that its policies 
and behavior may be unpredictable and shifting. A political party which had in the past 
demonstrated a lack of scruples about increasing tensions and creating a potential for 
riots was not expected to show restraint about provoking tensions between India and its 
neighbors. With this expectation, some observers anticipated increasing tensions at the 
border between the three nuclear powers, India, Pakistan and China. Interestingly, 
contrary to these expectations, India’s international policy did not become more 
confrontational under the BJP.  
Although the BJP government began its administration in 1998 with a 
demonstration of strength towards Pakistan by testing five nuclear bombs in May 1998, 
its overall course was less nationalistic than expected. One may even argue that had the 
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Congress been in power, the same would have occurred since the nuclear program had 
been initiated under the Congress. In 1999, when the Indian government reacted to a 
Pakistani intrusion into Kargil in Kashmir with massive use of land and air forces, the 
government limited the intervention to the Indian state of Kashmir and Jammu. Despite 
the obvious that the intruders were supported by Pakistan, the BJP government did not 
use the incident to expand its military mission. Instead, the BJP government acted 
responsibly, stopped the advance of the Indian troops at the Line of Control (LOC) and 
prevented herewith an escalation of the conflict into a war between India and Pakistan. In 
sum, the behaviour of the BJP government during the Kargil War was a success for 
Indian international policy and the BJP’s image. India’s domestic politics did not change 
significantly either. The BJP’s rhetoric on the national level was quite moderate. In some 
states, classical Hindutva themes were put back on the BJP’s party agenda. What are the 
factors that affected the janus-headed behavior of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 
led to changes in the party’s behavior? Is the BJP still a Hindu nationalistic party driven 
by a Hindu nationalistic ideology, or a party with a paramount interest in gaining power? 
Seeking answers to such questions is important for various reasons. First, India is 
the hegemonic power in South Asia with tremendous regional influence. A major shift in 
India’s policy will affect the region and its stability. Second, India’s policy is decisive for 
the security of the Indian Ocean and its shipping routes from Europe to East Asia. Third, 
India is a nuclear power involved in border disputes (Kashmir and Arunanchal Pradesh) 
with two other nuclear powers (Pakistan and China). A shift in Indian policy can lead to 
an escalation of conflict in the disputed areas and may pose a nuclear threat to the world. 
Fourth, India is a democracy with the largest population in the world and serves as an 
example for developing countries. Changes in the democratic foundation of India may 
affect other developing countries as well. 
It is important to examine the Bharatiya Janata Party’s background and agenda 
because, along with the Indian National Congress, it had a realistic chance of winning the 
2009 elections in India. Knowing more about the BJP, its roots and connections, as well 
as its political behavior makes shifts and changes more predictable and can help with  
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policy in the future. Additionally, understanding the BJP’s behavior and its use of 
religious and nationalistic rhetoric can help to improve the general understanding of how 
such parties behave in democracies. 
This thesis, therefore, offers to explain the BJP’s behavior and expand on the 
factors that affect it. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
India is a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic state. “It has 1652 languages (including 
dialects), 190 religions (including different religious sects), 26 states (the states 
comprises of different regions claiming autonomy) and 3742 castes.”1 Tensions and riots 
between Hindus and Muslims distressed India during the phase of separation of India and 
Pakistan. But violence between Hindus and Muslims continued in India after 1950 on an 
acceptable level for a multiethnic society.2 It increased again in the 1980s when Hindu 
nationalism rose. Following incidents in 1992, the relations between Hindus and Muslims 
deteriorated and endangered the secularist orientation of the country. The Hindu 
nationalist movement, led by organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS – National Volunteer Organization), and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP – World 
Hindu Council), an offshoot of the RSS, gained more influence. Their ideas and the 
legacy of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party (BJS – Indian People’s Union), a predecessor of 
the BJP, influenced the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which began to exploit religious 
issues for political purposes. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Kiran Saxena, “Hindutva of the Sangh Parivar and the Plural Society in India,”  Class, Ideology and 
Political Parties in India, eds. Arun K. Jana and Bhupen Sarmah (Colorado Springs: International 
Academic Publishers LTD, 2002), 168. 
2 S. D. Muni, “Ethnic Conflict, Federalism, and Democracy in India,” Ethnicity and Power in the 
Contemporary World, eds. Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery A. Tishkov (Toronto: United Nations University 
Press, 1996), 183 shows as the official data for 1955: 75 communal incidents, 24 people killed and 475 
people injured. These numbers increased until 1985: 525 communal incidents, 328 persons killed, 3,665 
persons injured. Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 87-111 shows different data sets for the national and the state level. 
Her data correspond with the official data but goes into more detail. She shows for example that most of the 
riots took place in urban areas. In contrast to this, rural areas were spared by riots. 
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In 1998, when the BJP gained power and formed a coalition at the center, it did 
not transfer its Hindu nationalist ideology into practice when it came to domestic and 
international politics. What were the reasons for this unexpected behavior by a Hindu 
nationalist party? Different explanations are possible. 
First, one could draw attention to the fact that India is a part of the international 
system and its behavior is dependent on the regulations of the international community 
and the expectations of partner nations. Despite a nationalistic ideology of a ruling party, 
any Indian government has to act according to the regulations of the international system 
and the expectations of partner nations. Only this kind of international policy can secure 
India an adequate position in the international system and form the necessary conditions 
for India’s economic development. Following this argument, Hindu nationalism could not 
in any way affect Indian policy in the international system without endangering India’s 
position in that international system. Maintaining an important international image is part 
of the BJP’s campaign promises.3 
Second, one could emphasize that secularism in India is deeply rooted in society 
and provides a common ground for the work of the Indian administration despite all 
differences in political matters. In accordance with this argument, tensions in India, riots 
and Hindu nationalism and other forms of cultural and ethnic expression appear only in 
terms of resource competition, but are subject to change when another political party 
comes to power. With such an argument, it would be doubtful whether Hindu nationalism 
as a policy choice could ever develop enough power to dominate Indian international and 
domestic policies because the executive power of India’s democracy would repulse all 
attempts to influence politics with a religious ideology. 
If this is true, Hindu nationalists, when in power, would not have any impact on 
India’s external relations except in the case of Kashmir. One has to question whether the 
Kashmir problem is a domestic problem of India, as Hindu nationalists argue, or a 
                                                 
3 See, for example, chapter 7 of the BJP Election Manifesto 1998  
http://www.bjp.org/content/view/2631/376/ (accessed October 10, 2009). “In the recent past we have seen a 
tendency to bend under pressure. This arises as much out of ignorance of our rightful place and role in 
world affairs as also from a loss of national self-confidence and resolve. A nation as large and capable as 
ourselves must make its impact felt on the world arena. A BJP Government will demand a premier position 
for the country in all global fora.” 
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problem of foreign policy, as Pakistan argues. It depends on one’s point of view whether 
the practical Kashmir politics of India could be influenced by Hindu nationalism and the 
politics of a Hindu nationalism party. If the Kashmir problem is seen as a domestic 
problem, the real character of Hindu nationalism could be decisive for Indian politics 
under rule of a Hindu nationalist party because Kashmir is one of the few regions in India 
with a Hindu minority. Here, one can examine the relationship of Hindu nationalists 
towards other religions in India. 
A third explanation, offered by several important scholars, would be to argue that 
when the BJP comes to power at the center as a member of a coalition made up of several 
different agendas at the national level, it has to make compromises which moderate its 
dominant Hindu nationalistic character. If this is true, the BJP when in power as part of a 
coalition has no mandate in the political constellation of India. However, we have yet to 
see what it would act like when it is in full power. For that, we should look at the states 
where it does hold a majority in order to understand what its behavior might be. 
A final argument could be that since Hindu nationalism is no longer as militant as 
it was in 1992 during the Ayodhya incident and the following riots, the success of the 
BJP belongs only partly to the mobilization of Hindu nationalist sentiment and the 
exploitation of symbols of Hinduism. Now, as a national party, it behaves differently. 
Additional factors have become a priority for practical politics of the party since it gained 
a national presence, and especially after 1998. 
In order to evaluate the possible influence of Hindu nationalism and BJP politics 
on Indian policy, it is necessary to examine the nature of Hindu nationalism and the 
BJP’s politics to extract the basic tenets of Hindu nationalism and the BJP’s party 
politics. 
The examination here will show that all of the above factors play a role in 
explaining the behavior of the BJP as a ruling party. But, it is neither Indian democracy 






influence on Indian policy in the future. Democracy and secularism are indeed an integral 
part of Indian society, even if some scholars, such as Jalal Ayesha,4 have their doubts 
about the depths of their roots in the society. 
The main point is that the diversity of Indian society, with its various demands in 
connection with the trend towards communalization has hampered the return of a one 
party system for India. It supports coalition building on the national level and requires the 
ability of different parties to make compromises in order to rule the country. This makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, for the government to be dominated by any special 
ideology. 
This thesis argues that political diversity in India led to an adjustment of 
enforceable political goals for the BJP during its period of governing India. The 
enforcement of Hindu nationalist objectives in Kashmir were not a primary goal for 
the BJP government compared to maintaining a position as a leader of the coalition. 
But, this adjustment of BJP politics did not mean that Hindu nationalism had lost 
power or that the BJP had changed its goals for the future. The thesis of this 
examination is that although the BJP has shelved Hindu nationalist objectives, it is 
still a nationalist party and is capable of reviving its Hindu nationalist objectives if it 
can gain advantages by doing so. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
According to Bardach, “Policy analysis is more art than science. It draws on 
intuition as much as method.”5 The reason for this judgment about policy analysis is the 
complexity of the research area and the involvement of humans and the uncertainty of 
human behavior. Therefore, White argues: “Policies, and public problems in general, are 
embedded in complex, dimly perceived institutional and historical context. Stakeholders 
are numerous, and their interests not obvious. Any given situation will have meanings to 
                                                 
4 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
5 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2005), xiv. 
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some that can hardly be imagined by others of different background, training, or social 
location.”6 Thus, after defining the problem, in principle, one has firstly to arrange and 
examine the relevant factors of the problem situation. This will help to reduce the 
complexity of the problem situation, to reveal hidden facts and interests, and to reduce 
the range of interpretations. As White states, relevant factors are the institutional context, 
the historical context, and stakeholders (key players) and their interests. 
This examination will follow the principles of White’s explanation and examine 
the context of BJP’s policy. The institutional framework for the behavior of the BJP is 
built by the principles of party politics, the principles of state’s behavior, the framework 
of India’s democracy and its political party system. Stakeholders, in the sense of White, 
are Hindu nationalists and supporters of the BJP. Obviously, the historical context is 
relevant for examining the development of BJP’s policy over time, but it is also relevant 
for explaining the institutional framework and the behavior of key players. To avoid that 
a too broad general depiction of the BJP policy over time lead to a misjudgment about 
BJP’s policy, the examination also has to include case studies to explore in more detail 
which factors and how those factors shaped BJP’s behavior in single cases. 
In order to follow the depicted methodology, the thesis is organized as an 
examination comprised of the introduction, three chapters and the conclusion. 
The thesis is comprised of the introduction (Chapter I), three chapters and the 
conclusion. Chapter II provides the theoretical framework for the BJP’s behavior and 
some major cornerstones of India’s democracy. The theoretical framework consists of 
two parts. The first part examines the principles of party politics, the second deals with 
the politics of nation-states. To explain the BJP’s behavior as a political party, the party’s 
foundation is examined in order to find out which forces influence its behavior. 
Furthermore, the examination of some major factors which influence state behavior 
shows the possible limitations placed on a party’s ideology in influencing the politics of a 
nation-state. Additionally, an examination of the cornerstones of India’s democracy 
shows how the construction of India’s democracy has shaped India’s party system and 
                                                 
6 Michael J. White, “Policy Analysis Models,” Encyclopedia of Policy Studies, edited by Stuart S. 
Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1983), 44. 
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the behavior of political parties. These examinations will then be used as references to 
explain the BJP’s behavior.  
Chapter III gives an overview of Hindu nationalism. The first part of the chapter 
explains the most relevant terms of Hindu nationalism to ensure a common understanding 
of these basic terms. The second part of the chapter examines the Hindu Nationalist 
network to show the main Hindu nationalistic forces in India, their connections, and their 
influence on the BJP.  
Chapter IV explains the BJP’s politics in more detail. The examination consists 
of two case studies and historical issues. The examination of BJP’s politics over a time 
frame of twenty-eight years shows continuities and discontinuities in its behavior in order 
to discover the core character of the BJP as a basis to predict its future behavior. 
Additionally, the two case studies provide examples of the BJP’s politics and behavior in 
two prominent examples. The Ayodhya case is an example of how the BJP behaves in the 
domestic sphere and how Hindu nationalism influences its behavior. The Kashmir case 
demonstrates how domestic politics and Hindu nationalism may influence the behavior of 
a government with relevance for international relations. Together, both examples show 
which factors influence the BJP’s behavior, lead to certain political actions by the BJP, 
and how Hindu nationalism influences politics in India. 
Chapter V offers a conclusion of the findings and gives a prospective of the 




II. DEMOCRACIES AND POLICY MAKING 
This chapter examines the primary framework for the behavior of political parties 
in general and especially for India. To explain a party’s behavior in principle, first one 
has to analyze the foundation of party politics. This means looking at roles and functions 
of political parties and examining the different forces which try to influence and shape a 
party’s behavior. Herewith, one gains a theoretical overview about party politics in a 
liberal democracy and what shapes their behavior. This will serve as the reference for the 
examination of the BJP’s behavior. In addition, it is necessary to examine the theoretical 
framework for the behavior of a nation-state in the context of domestic and international 
relations in order to explain the BJP’s behavior. Furthermore, it is necessary to have a 
closer look at some major aspects of India’s democracy in order to examine the 
institutional framework for political parties in India. This institutional framework for 
political parties will be used in subsequent chapters in order to explain the BJP’s behavior 
and its shifts over time 
A. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Party Politics 
Defining a political party is not as easy as it seems. Various definitions of parties 
emphasize their function as instruments to mediate between citizens (voters) and 
government, their function as a tool to gain power or to focus on the ideological roots of 
parties. Any definition has, therefore, less explanatory power, and will probably provoke 
disagreement rather than consensus.7 It is also difficult to identify the relative position of 
a political party in comparison to any other political party.8 However, for the purpose of 
this examination, it is less important to find a common definition of political parties or to 
distinguish political parties from each other than to examine a political party’s general 
                                                 
7 John Kenneth White, “What is a Political Party?” Handbook of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz 
and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 5-15. 
8 See Ian Budge, “Identifying Dimensions and Locating Parties: Methodological and Conceptual 
Problems,” Handbook of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage 
Publications, 2006), 413-421. 
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roles and functions to find out which forces influence the party’s behavior and to get a 
glimpse of the relationship between society, party and government. This examination will 
help to better understand party behavior and its changes over time. 
a. Roles and Functions of Political Parties in Liberal Democracies 
Political parties in liberal democracies fulfill various functions. Depending 
on the type of political party, these functions are revealed differently. In principle, the 
main function of political parties in a liberal democracy is to serve as a connecting link 
between the people and the political entities. They serve this function in various ways. 
First, political parties are a means for representation of the people. Second, they 
communicate the opinions of the people and social groups to the state and the public 
realm. Third, they reconcile interests of various social groups. Fourth, they mediate 
between the people and the political entities. Fifth, they help to select people for official 
posts. Altogether, political parties finally fulfill a role to ensure legitimacy for democracy 
and state institutions. 9 
One of the major functions of political parties in a democracy is 
representing the people. Who is to be represented and forms in which the representation 
should occur depend on the political system in the country, on the organization and 
composition of the political party and on the individual delegate. In principle, a delegate 
can represent a group of the people (based on demographic criteria), an opinion of the 
electorate, the constituents by following their direct instructions or acting in the interest 
of the electorate by using his own judgment, or serve as an ombudsman for the electorate. 
In the same matter, political parties can serve in various ways as means for 
representation. But, political parties always represent just a specific part of the electorate. 
The electorate as a whole is represented by the parliament and the sum of all delegates 
and political parties.10 
                                                 
9 For a further distinction between types of political parties and the relationship between type and 
function see Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Types and Functions of Parties,” Political Parties and 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 
3-39. 
10 Richard S. Katz, “Party in Democratic Theory,” Handbook of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz 
and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 34-46 and 42-44. 
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By communicating with the electorate and its various social groups, 
political parties integrate different political opinions, interests and expectations and form 
a new position which includes major points of all relevant groups and can gain support 
from the majority of the party’s electorate. Therefore, political parties fulfill an important 
function in the process of opinion forming and participation of the people in a 
democracy. In contrast to interest groups which represent the interests of different power 
groups, political parties can serve as a forum for those people who have no access to 
interest groups or they can bring various groups together. Without political parties, it is 
probable that poor people would gain no influence in the opinion building process of a 
country. Their participation in politics would, therefore, be limited to participation in 
elections. 
As shown, the function of political parties in the process of opinion 
forming is not limited to serving as a vehicle for interests of different social groups. 
Additionally, political parties serve as a filter to reconcile different interests and find a 
consensus or a compromise for representation in the ongoing process of opinion forming 
and decision making. This filter function leads to a marginalization of extreme positions, 
balances different interests, and helps to make the decision making process on the state 
level more efficient.11 This positive consequence of the process is affiliated with the 
negative effect that, for example, legitimate claims of minorities often get lost in the 
process except when the minorities find an independent party for representation of their 
interests.12 
With their mediating position between the people and the political entities, 
political parties are also able to mediate directly between the people and the government. 
Especially in cases where decisions of a central government may have major impact on 
specific regions or specific groups of society, political parties play an important role in 
negotiating between the government and the persons affected. Political parties have more 
access to the decisive political power institutions than interest groups, know the rules of 
                                                 
11 Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page, “Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes,” 
British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (January 1998): 139-158. 
12 Peter M. Leslie. “The Role of Political Parties in Promoting the Interests of Ethnic Minorities,” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 2, no. 4 (December 1969): 
419-433. 
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the political “game” and can balance between the claims of the people and the interests of 
the government. By taking care of this function, political parties can gain more 
legitimacy for speaking on behalf of the people.13 
Because of their special position in the democratic process, political 
parties are a major resource for the selection of personnel for leading posts in a 
bureaucracy and the executive branch. One obvious argument for this function is that the 
government has to rely on loyal obedience in the executive branch. Another argument is 
that political parties gather a lot of experience with political procedures and are, 
therefore, particularly suited to selecting the right persons for relevant posts in the 
political sphere. However, critics of this function of political parties argue that loyalty is 
less decisive for leading posts than qualifications and knowledge. Additionally, they 
criticize that the argument about expertise of selection by political parties hides the fact 
that political parties misuse their opportunities to select people for official posts to 
establish a kind of patronage system or nepotism.14 
Political parties are part of the process of formation of political objectives 
in a democracy. Without political parties, the opportunities of the people to become 
involved in the process of formation of political objectives are reduced. People would 
have fewer opportunities to express their opinions and interests and to gain influence. 
How far political parties fulfill these different functions depends on the country’s 
individual political system, the individual circumstances of the country and on the 
individual political party and its voter base. In principle, one can argue that political 
parties have more importance in a parliamentary system than in a presidential system 
where associations and different interest groups are more involved in the process of 
opinion formation. In the case of India, this is likewise true for the role and the function 
of the BJP. 
                                                 
13 Hans Keman “Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies,” 
Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 160-174 (London: Sage 
Publications, 2006). 
14 Marjorie Randon Hershey, “Political Parties as Mechanisms of Social Choice,” Handbook of Party 
Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 75-88. And 
Wolfgang Mueller, “Party Patronage and Party Colonization of the State” in Handbook of Party Politics, 
eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 189-195. 
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b. Behavior of Political Parties in Liberal Democracies 
(1) The Influence of the Voter Base and the Party Identity. The 
behavior of political parties is influenced by several factors. One obvious factor is the set 
of roles and functions parties have to play in a liberal democracy to ensure the legitimacy 
of democracy and state institutions. Political parties connect the people and political 
institutions and help to ensure awareness of the political process, opinion forming and 
democracy in the population. They offer the people an opportunity to express their 
opinions and to participate in the process of the formation of political objectives, and to 
decide about the direction of politics. As a product of the opinion of the party’s voter 
base, political parties offer the people an idea or an ideology. The ideology is the core of 
a political party. Or, as Vasallo mentions “Political ideologies portray the true essence of 
parties, as in ‘what they are,’…”15 The party’s ideology is laid down in a party manifesto. 
These manifestos serve two main functions. The first is that they are an expression of 
people’s opinions and interests. The second is that the individual party tries to convince 
the people about political opinions.16 In this sense, ideologies are tools to attract voters, 
but also a means to motivate activists and build bridges to collateral organizations. 
Parties’ behaviors may change over time, but a change of their core ideology at the 
foundation of the party is very unlikely. Political parties usually retain a general 
ideological tendency.17 
The reason for retention of a general ideology is two fold. On the 
one hand, structural changes of society, structural dealignments, declining party 
identification, changes in value orientations, issue competition, fluctuations between 
governments and opposition parties and changes within the parties (party crisis) lead to 
changes of the electoral markets over time. To stay competitive in the marketplace of 
ideas in liberal democracies, political parties have to respond to these alterations and have 
                                                 
15 Francesca Vasallo and Clyde Wilcox, “Party as a Carrier of Ideas,” Handbook of Party Politics, eds. 




to make changes in their manifestos and adjust their behavior.18 As an examination of 
political parties in Western Europe shows, parties often response by transforming “… 
themselves more and more into centralized and professional campaigning organizations, 
in which the scope for the amateur politician has been curtailed, and in which the weight 
and direction of the party strategy have tended increasingly to be located within the 
leadership as such.”19 The tendency towards the center of social opinion means that 
cleavages in society have lost importance for organizing politics. Additionally, Larson 
argues, “Even where cleavages clearly exist, parties are more likely to win national 
elections by avoiding them and reaching out to a much larger electorate.”20 On the other 
hand, a party’s opportunities for change are limited due to their ideological foundations. 
Parties with strong ideological foundations must face the problem that opportunities for 
change are limited by the party’s ideology. A party’s ideology serves an important 
purpose because it ensures cohesiveness of the political party. And this cohesiveness 
ensures that the party acts as a team and gives the voter at the polls the opportunity to 
make the team responsible for its action.21 
Herewith, the core voter base of a party is, in principle, decisive 
for the formulation of the ideology and is one decisive factor which influences the party’s 
behavior. Every party has to examine its voter base and the opinions of its party 
members. In order to play their role in the political arena and serve as mediators between 
the people and the government, political parties have to be organized according to the 
principles of democracy. This means that every member of the party in principle has to 
have the same chance to gain influence on the process of the party’s political opinion 
                                                 
18 Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Mueller and Fritz Plasser, “Introduction: Electoral Challenges and Party 
Responses,” Political Parties and Electoral Change. Party Responses to Electoral Markets, eds. Peter 
Mair, Wolfgang C. Mueller and Fritz Plasser (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 1-19. 
19 Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Mueller and Fritz Plasser, “Conclusion: Political Parties in Changing 
Electoral Markets,” Political Parties and Electoral Change. Party Responses to Electoral Markets, eds. 
Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Mueller and Fritz Plasser (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 265. 
20 Kay Lawson, “Five Variations on a Theme. Interest Aggregation by Party Today,” How Political 
Parties Respond. Interest Aggregation Revisited, eds. Kay Lawson and Thomas Poguntke (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 253. 
21 Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2007), 3. 
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formation as any other member of the party. The inner party opinion forming process has 
to be organized in a way that allows different opinions to be openly expressed and 
discussed. The will of the party (leadership) should not stand above the will of the party 
members.22 Thus, one of the decisive features of political parties is a constant bargaining 
process inside the political party about the future direction of party politics. Therefore, 
party behavior may vary over time due to a changing balance of power inside the party. 
But, the search for acceptable compromises in the political 
bargaining process is not just limited to the inner workings of a political party. Party 
behavior is influenced as well by a bargaining process with the outside. Political parties 
often use other organizations that share a common basis with that political party to ensure 
constant communication with the electorate to learn about the will of the people and to 
strengthen ties to the electorate. These collateral organizations promise to support the 
political party in exchange for gaining influence through the political parties. According 
to Poguntke, a key feature is that “This exchange is based on more or less permanent and 
formalized negotiations between party elites and organizational elites (…) by which 
policy concessions (by the party) are traded for the mobilization of organizational support 
(by the organization).”23 Dependent on the membership (e.g., overlapping between party 
and organization), organizational ties, control by the party or influence of the 
organization, one can distinguish various types of collateral organizations which support 
political parties. But, in any case, political parties have to pay for the support by collateral 
organizations. Strong connections to a collateral organization limit the freedom of action 
for a political party.24 For instance, in the case of the BJP, strong connections to 
collateral Hindu nationalistic organizations may help to explain the BJP’s behavior and 
its Hindu nationalistic approach to politics between 1984 and 1992. 
 
                                                 
22 Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat, “Candidate Selection: Methods and Consequences,” 
Handbook of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 
109-121. 
23 Thomas Poguntke, “Political Parties and Other Organizations,” Handbook of Party Politics, eds. 
Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 396. 
24 Ibid., 402. 
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(2) The Influence of Other Forces and Party Interests In 
addition to collateral organizations which share a common basis with the political party, 
parties also have to deal with other kinds of interest groups. Besides the media, the 
bureaucracy, academics and others, interest groups play an important role in liberal 
democracies and have significant power to influence politics. All these forces offer 
political parties the opportunity to gain different kinds of benefits, and to expand their 
support base or their sphere of influence. These forces also have an interest in gaining 
influence in political parties because only elected party members offer direct and long 
lasting participation in the process of political opinion forming and decision making.25 
Political parties do not just have the goal to unite voters under the 
head of a party in order to express the opinion of the electorate. Another practical goal is 
to gain the necessary power in order to influence politics. A political party that only 
represents the standpoint of its voter base by rejecting opposing standpoints does not 
achieve anything in the political arena. Not only that, such a party would not be able to 
gain influence for the interests of its voters; it would also give up opportunities to fulfill 
the general roles and functions of a political party in a democracy. In order to fulfill these 
roles, a political party has to develop the ability to actively participate in politics by 
balancing the desire of the electorate with what is attainable in practical politics. This 
includes the mentioned bargaining process inside and outside the political party as well as 
bargaining with other forces. Without consideration of the stance of the media, of public 
opinion and public mood, support of interest groups and academics, and control over the 
bureaucracy, a political party would not be able to successfully transform its ideas into 
executive power.26 The ability to build a minimum consensus is a precondition for any 
successful government politics. 
                                                 
25 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (New York: Harper Collins College, 
1995) shows an example of how, in principle, this process of influencing, opinion forming, agenda setting, 
and decision making works in the U.S. 
26 Hans Keman, “Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies.” in 
Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 160-174 (London: Sage 
Publications, 2006). 
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Additionally, political parties have to be able to form alliances and 
build coalitions in order to form a government. Especially in democracies with 
proportional representation or Mixed Member Electoral Systems, it is unlikely that one 
party is able to win a majority of the seats in parliament. In parliamentary systems, this 
means that coalition building is very likely necessary to form the government and transfer 
the vote of the electorate into executive power. Therefore, under these circumstances, 
political parties that want to gain influence in the executive have to deal with the problem 
of coalition building.27 Different theories have evolved to explain how political parties 
form coalitions and why they form specific coalitions. But, these theories are not 
sufficient to explain and predict coalition building. Besides a variety of theoretical 
problems to analyze and predict coalition building, three main factors seem to influence 
the process of coalition building. First, the desire of a political party to gain influence 
and power. Second, coalitions are built with the minimum necessary number of different 
parties to ensure a majority in parliament. Third, political parties are prone to choosing 
those political parties with fewer ideological differences to form a coalition to ensure a 
coherent policy of the coalition.28 
The task for any political party that wants to gain executive power 
and be part of a coalition is to balance the core interests of the voter base with the 
necessity of coming to compromises with its coalition partners. Or, in other words, the 
party leadership has to gain influence by reaching compromises and forming alliances 
without losing its party identity. The outcome of this bargaining process is a coalition 
agreement in which the coalition partners establish rules of cooperation between the 
coalition partners, reach agreements in various fields of politics, and set the direction of 
future politics. This balancing process is more difficult than it seems. One obvious reason 
is that inside a coalition, political opinions concerning details of future politics often are 
often diverse. Another reason is that after elections, the electorate’s power to influence 
the political direction of a political party is weakened, and the function of the political 
                                                 
27 See: Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, 151, for a more detailed view of the 
relationship between electoral systems and party systems. 
28 Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont, “Parties into Government: Still Many Puzzles” in Handbook 
of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 175-188. 
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party for the people over time may be replenished by functions for the political party 
itself. Critics of political party systems often argue that party officials forget the 
supporting function of the political party for the people. Instead of serving the electorate, 
party officials focus more on personal advantages or the advantages for the political party 
itself. The party’s orientation often shifts away from the notion that the will of the people 
sets the direction of the party, and that party politics is tied to the will of the people. 
Instead of focusing on goals set by the electorate, the survival or the power of a political 
party and its leaders becomes the ultimate goal and an end in itself. The supporting 
function of political parties for the people then is replaced by a supporting function of the 
people for the party. As an examination of political parties in democracies shows, most 
political parties reassure the losers of society but fulfill the needs of the winners of 
society when they are elected. What distinguishes major political parties’ from each other 
are therefore different standpoints on issues which are of less interest for the voters.29 
c. Conclusion 
Political parties fulfill important functions in the political arena as 
mediators between the people and the state and ensure legitimacy for democracy and 
state institutions. Political parties stand for the opinions and interests of the party 
members. But, especially in parties up to a certain size, it impossible to speak about just 
one opinion or interest of all party members. Party opinion is formed and party interest is 
defined by an inner party bargaining process including collateral organizations. 
Therefore, party opinion and party interests are always compromises consisting of many 
individual opinions and interests. Even if the general orientation (based on a political idea 
or ideology) of a political party is stable, the party direction may vary over time or in 
certain details. This variation is an expression of the development of the party and the 
bargaining process within the party and with collateral organizations. In the case of the 
BJP, this means that it is likely that the party’s direction will change over time, but it is 
unlikely that the ideology will change significantly. 
                                                 
29 Lawson, Five Variations on a Theme. Interest Aggregation by Party Today, 253. 
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Second, as political parties have to establish democratic elements in the 
inner party opinion forming process to enable all party members active participation, they 
also have to deal with other forces in a liberal democracy. Political parties are not the 
only power which plays an important role in the decision making process in a liberal 
democracy. Other groups, such as the media, interest groups, business groups, trade 
unions and nongovernmental organizations represent different parts of the society and 
can influence public opinion and support or prevent the transfer of party politics into 
practice. Thus, in order to implement its own politics, a political party has to deal with all 
kinds of interest groups. Even a political party with a strong ideological basis, such as the 
BJP has to accommodate its politics to make it acceptable for other influential parts of 
society. 
Third, in order to gain executive power, a political party has to develop 
the ability to form coalitions with other political parties. This means that a political party 
has to bargain and to balance the interests of its electorate with what is negotiable with 
other parties. Thus, the ability of a political party to come to a compromise with other 
political parties is a precondition to gain executive power, especially in a multiparty 
system. 
Thus, party politics is a result of a complex bargaining process. For a 
cultural ideological political party, such as the BJP, the overarching goal of this 
bargaining process is to transfer as much as possible of the core party identity, its 
ideology, into practical politics. As a first step, it is necessary to convince the core voter 
base of the ideology and to develop the ideology towards practical politics in order to 
make it suitable to the core voter base. As a second step, the development of the ideology 
must go further to gain support from collateral organizations. Following this, the party 
ideology is defined and major changes are unlikely. The next steps of the bargaining 
process will involve forces from the outside with less obvious bonds to the political party 
and its ideology. In a third step, a political party has to deal with other kinds of influential 
forces. The result of this bargaining process is not a change in party ideology but an 
adaptation of party politics to make them more acceptable to other forces and to gain 
support from other organizations and institutions. This pressure to adapt practical party 
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politics is further revealed in the fourth step, the coalition building. If a political party is 
to gain executive power and build a coalition, it has to deal with other political parties. In 
contrast to other forces, these potential coalition partners fulfill the same functions and 
roles and pursue the same goals as any other political party. This makes the bargaining 
process more difficult because the claims by the electorate are high and political 
differences matter more and can destabilize a coalition. But, due to the fact that coalition 
partners can only gain power when they make compromises, the pressure to make 
compromises is high as seen in the case of the BJP when it came to power as part of a 
collation in 1999. Although the outcome of this bargaining process will probably further 
influence a party’s behavior, it will not lead to a change in the party’s ideology. But, the 
outcome is decisive for the politics of the executive when the coalition comes to govern 
the country. Coalition partners are mutually dependent. In order to stay in power, they 
have to stay on a course of compromise between the coalition partners. 
2. Politics of Nation-States 
In order to explain the behavior of a state in the international realm, one can deal 
with different theories of international relations and their specific views of the 
international system and the influence of various factors on the behavior of a state. To 
explain the specific behavior of a domestic party when it comes to ruling a country, it is 
necessary to examine some aspects of international relations theory. For the purpose of 
this examination, it is sufficient to focus on the major factors which influence the 
behavior of any state, such as identity and interests of a state. Both factors are based on 
different theories of International Relations (identity – constructivism; interest – realism), 
but this distinction is not decisive for choosing these factors. Rather, it is to note that 
identity brings focus on domestic influences on state behavior and the interest factor 
focuses on the international aspects of state behavior. 
a. The Question of Identity for a Nation-State 
The modern nation-state has its historical origins in Western Europe. One 
of these origins is the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It marked the transition from a ruling 
system based on multiple overlapping feudal political authorities and a power struggle 
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between religious and secular powers to the development of states with sovereignty 
rights. Sovereignty means the exclusive right to exercise political authority over a given 
territory.30 As Max Weber stated, the state evolved as “… a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”“31 The integration of the nation and the state took place after the French 
Revolution when the idea that rulers and subordinates identified themselves as citizens of 
a common state took ground. According to Spruyt, “State building (the attempt to 
enhance the capacity to rule) and nation building (the attempt to construct a shared 
political identity among the subjects of that particular territorial state) thus went hand in 
hand.”32 Hence, the answer to the question of the identity of a nation is a precondition for 
defining the common ground of a nation state. Haas defines the nation-state as “… a 
political entity whose inhabitants consider themselves a single nation and wish to remain 
one.” 33 National identity is, therefore, decisive for the bond and relationship between the 
state and its citizens, and the arrangement and recognition of personal rights and duties. 
According to Smith, “The appeal to national identity has become the main legitimation 
for social order and solidarity today.”34 Even in the age of globalization and the 
increasing importance of supranational organizations, the nation-state remains the basic 
unit of the international system. Likewise, national identity will retain its importance. As 
Smith argues, “A growing cosmopolitanism does not in itself entail the decline of 
nationalism; the rise of regional culture areas does not diminish the hold of national 
identities.”35  
 
                                                 
30 For more details about the term sovereignty and its definitions, see Stephen D. Krasner. “Abiding 
Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 22, no. 3, 
Transformation of International Relations: Between Change and Continuity. Transformations des relations 
internationales: entre rupture et continuité (July 2001): 229-251.  
31 Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology. Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 
32 Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 5 (2002), 133. 
33 Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 23. 
34 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 16. 
35 Ibid., 175. 
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According to Wendt, the corporate identity of a nation-state still generates 
four basic interests: 
 
1. Physical security, including its differentiation from other actors 
2. Ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, 
which creates a desire for stable social identities 
3. Recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through 
brute force 
4. Development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better 
life, for which states are repositories at the collective level36 
 
However, the term identity is not easy to define because it is used in 
diverse ways in social science and can refer to the individual or to a collective. 
Additionally, individuals and groups do not have one single identity. Every individual is 
composed of multiple identities and so is any group. Which identity is dominant can vary 
over time and from individual to individual, based on their changing socio-political 
context. Therefore, the affiliation of an individual to a group with a collective identity can 
change over time as well. Additionally, in case of a nation-state the national identity is 
influenced by forces from different directions. According to Wendt, “Some state 
identities and interests stem primarily from relations to domestic society (“liberal,” 
“democratic”), others from international society (“hegemon,” “balancer”).”37 
To make it even more complicated, collective identities also can change 
because they are based on social classifications that may be modified or abolished. 
National identity refers to the collective identity of a group which may influence the 
relationship of the group towards the nation state. Relevant features for a national identity 
are ethnicity, culture, history, traditions, myths, territory, and economy,38 and with regard 
to international relations the position in the international system. But, as shown, national 
identity is not a static term but a complex and flexible construct with many facets. In any 
                                                 
36 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” The American 
Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 385.  
37 Ibid., 385. 
38 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 1-18. 
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case, coherence of the nation-state is decisive for a national identity. The internal 
coherence of a nation-state is explained in three ways: According to Kowert, the nation-
state “(1) satisfied the needs of individuals; (2) satisfied the needs of powerful social 
groups; and (3) is the culmination of large social processes that neither individuals nor 
groups can control.” 39 
A nation-state has to deal with such various disparities to define a national 
identity. Major changes in a national identity could endanger the existence of that nation-
state. A contested national identity may lead to tensions in the state, increase the danger 
of factionalism along fault lines of different identities, produce separatist movements and 
riots and can lead to a breakdown of the state. According to Eder, “The state remains, 
albeit in a scaled-down version. It is the nation that is problematized: the cultural unity 
and homogeneity which served as its raison d’être … Where established social identities, 
institutions, and practices of politics appear to falter, identities are ethnicized, and 
mobilized to replace them.”40 Hence, a national identity, however defined, is a 
precondition for the existence of a national state and a stable democracy. Especially for 
states with a federal political system in which power is distributed to different levels, a 
common national identity (in form of a Staatsvolk) is a necessary precondition in order to 
ensure a stable nation-state.41 Creating and preserving a national identity is, therefore, a 
task for the political leaders of a country to ensure coherence of their nation-state. This is 
especially important in a diverse state such as India with its different cultures, ethnics, 
languages and religions. If, in the case of India, a Hindu nationalistic party as the BJP 
tried to establish a national identity dominated by Hinduism, it would exclude major parts 
of the society and endanger the national unity and stability of the nation-state. 
                                                 
39 Paul A. Kowert, “National Identity: Inside and Out” In The Origins of National Interests, eds. Glenn 
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b. The Question of Interests for a State 
Interest-based approaches in the theory of international relations focus on 
the behavior of nation-states in the international realm. The main focus of nation-states is 
to preserve their own survival against any threat from the outside or inside. But, it is not 
enough to ensure the pure existence of a territorial entity. As shown, the notion of a state 
is closely tied to sovereignty and the unchallenged right to control the territory of that 
state. Sovereignty of the state is the condition sine qua non for the existence of a state. To 
ensure the survival of the state means to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the state. 
How best to protect the sovereignty of the state is disputed in international 
theory.42 For example, if the assumption is made that the international system is based on 
anarchy, then it is best to try to gain more relative power in comparison to other states to 
ensure superiority over possible opponents. Defensive realists would then argue that a 
state could be satisfied with this kind of relative superiority that ensured sovereignty of 
its own state and preserved its status in the international system.43 In contrast to this, 
supporters of offensive realism argue that nation-states have the goal of gaining more 
power (e.g., by conquering other nation-states) and improving their status in the 
international system. Mearsheimer argues that “the ultimate goal of every great power is 
to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system,”44 in other 
words, to become a hegemon. In this sense, becoming a hegemon is the best way to 
increase the state’s security and preserve the sovereignty of the nation-state. Once a 
hegemon, nation-states have to face different challenges, from rising countries, for 
example, which may lead to a decline of the hegemon. Structural realists argue that “… 
                                                 
42 A broad overview about theories of international relations is given by Stephen M. Walt. 
“International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy no. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers 
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in their twilight years great powers try to arrest or reverse their decline.”45 This may lead 
to a hegemonic war initiated by the hegemon or the rising rival.46 
But, even if the question of sovereignty is the fundamental question for the 
existence of a state, it is not the only one. Due to globalization, nation-states now face a 
dilemma: they have to partly renounce sovereignty rights in order to gain specific 
advantages by joining supranational institutions, organizations or regimes. The economic 
world order is no longer determined by nation-states alone. Stiglitz argues that we have 
instead “… a system that might be called global governance without global government, 
one in which a few institutions – the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO – and few players – 
the finance, commerce, and trade ministries, closely linked to certain financial and 
commercial interests – dominate the scene, but in which many of those affected by their 
decisions are left almost voiceless.”47 
Additionally, nation-states have to face the fact that even if their formal 
sovereignty is untouched, their effective sovereignty is partly limited. To stay 
competitive in a globalized market and prevent the migration of labor, nation-states have 
to make concessions to globally operating companies or to national industries. Therefore, 
they are de facto less sovereign than they seem to be. The scale of losses of sovereignty 
rights depends on the willingness of any individual nation-state to relinquish rights, and 
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hand over rights. In any case, these losses of sovereignty do not lead per se to a loss of 
status as a nation-state because every nation-state has, in principle, to deal with this 
trend.48 
The discussion about sovereignty rights makes clear that the preservation 
of sovereignty in all areas of politics is not an aim per se for the nation-state. According 
to structural realists, the overarching goal for a nation-state is to preserve or to increase 
its relative power in comparison to potential opponents because this power increases its 
national security. The question of power is, therefore, sometimes, or in some political 
areas, dominant over the question of full sovereignty. This is most obvious in the case of 
economic power. First, economic strength or industrial capacity is often combined with 
military power. A prosperous economy enables a nation-state to maintain a strong 
military power. Second, economic strength gives a nation-state the opportunity to gain 
more influence in supranational organizations or over other nation-states. This means that 
an economically strong nation-state is able to gain a position of superiority in the 
international realm and increase its own security by joining a supranational organization 
or institution and herewith accepting a loss of sovereignty. In contrast to this, economic 
underdevelopment could mean a loss of relative power and could lead, in consequence, to 
a security threat. Besides military power, economic strength is, therefore, one important 
factor for the national power of a state. Other elements of national power are population, 
national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of 
government.49 
With reference to these elements of national power, even realists deal with 
questions of identity (the national character) and build the connection between domestic 
issues (national morale) and international politics. For Morgenthau, national character 
and national morale “… stand out both for their elusiveness from the point of rational 
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prognosis and for their permanent and often decisive influence upon the weight a nation 
is able to put into the scale of international politics.”50 In the sense of Morgenthau, the 
national character of a nation is relatively stable and long-lasting, therefore, it is 
predictable for other nation-states. The problem for other nation-states is less the entire 
national character of another national state, but which of the different facets of a national 
character of a national-state will dominate. In contrast to this, national morale is per se 
unstable and, therefore, very unpredictable. 
This discussion about power and interest of a nation-state shows that 
foreign policy is not independent of domestic policy. Moreover, policy has to take into 
consideration not only rational elements of power, but also factors that may seem to be 
irrational. 
One important factor is the policy of prestige which has been critical for 
the BJP as it has presented itself as a party of national honor. According to Weber, the 
influence and importance of prestige is hard to measure, “… but it is very obvious. The 
realm of ‘honor,’ which is comparable to the ‘status order’ within a social structure, 
pertains also to the interrelations of political structures.”51 This means that the 
recognition of a nation-state by other nation-states, or its reputation for power, is an 
important factor for influencing the international politics of a nation-state. Or, as 
Morgenthau argues: “The policy of prestige has two possible ultimate objectives: prestige 
for its own sake or, much more frequently, prestige in support of a policy of the status 
quo or of imperialism.”52 Most often, a policy of prestige is a substitute for a loss of hard 
power. In this case, prestige ensures the nation-state the recognition and the status of its 
powerful history. For a nation-state, this could be important for domestic reasons in order 
to keep national morale high and ensure the support of the public. Thus, although a policy 
of prestige appears at first view to be irrational, it is, with its link to the national morale 
of a state, rational and quite in the interest of a state. 
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c. Conclusion 
The discussion about the different elements of power shows a link 
between the policy of prestige, national morale and its influence on the power of a state. 
It makes clear that facets of national identity are inseparably connected with aspects of 
national power. Questions of national identity are an integral part of power politics. 
Therefore, questions about the national interests of a nation-state include also, in a 
broader sense, questions about national identity and aspects of the domestic politics of a 
nation-state. Additionally, elements of national interests may influence the national 
identity of a state and can shape it over time. With this, aspects of national identity and of 
national interest influence each other in different ways; they are two sides of the same 
coin. 
For a government based on a party with a strong party ideology, such as 
the BJP in India, this interaction of national identity and national interest has several 
practical implications. First, even if party ideology puts the focus on specific parts of 
national identity, such as ethnicity or religion, the transfer into practice is limited by the 
ability of a nation to change its identity. An ideology which excludes major parts of the 
society will endanger the coherence of the nation and may endanger the future of the 
nation-state. Second, especially in diverse societies, the foreign policy of a nation-state 
has to consider the national identity of that nation-state. In a liberal democracy, any 
foreign policy which does not consider national identity would endanger the coherence of 
the nation-state and could, therefore, endanger the power of the ruling political party. 
This means that party ideology is less decisive for the foreign policy of a liberal 
democracy if this ideology is not an integral part of the national identity. If, for example, 
the Hindu nationalistic ideology of the BJP finds no common ground in India’s society, it 
could not dominate foreign policy because this would endanger the coherence of the 
nation-state. Third, nation-states are today more interconnected and dependent on each 
other. Domestic politics has an influence on the perception of a nation-state by other 
nation-states and can influence their stance and behavior towards each other. Therefore, 
even domestic politics on the national level has to consider the possible perception of 
other nation-states. Increasing nationalism in a nation-state is a source of worry for other 
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states, and therefore for international cooperation. Especially in developing countries, 
such as India, the possible influence of nationalism on politics has to be limited in order 
to avoid exclusion by the international community and to further ensure the influx of 
foreign capital. Fourth, in comparison to the past, the position of a nation-state in the 
international realm is not defined only by hard power, but more by soft power and good 
diplomacy. To strengthen national morale, a government relies less on a demonstration of 
hard power and more on good diplomacy to increase its prestige and national morale. So, 
a Hindu nationalistic government also may utilize soft power to demonstrate national 
strength and power without neglecting its nationalistic ideology or endangering national 
identity. 
B. DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 
Democracies are organized and run in various ways. Lijphart identifies ten 
differences and differentiates broadly between two dimensions of differences and 
explains how these differences in principle shape politics.53 The first dimension focuses 
on the characteristics of the arrangement of executive power, the party, the electoral 
system, and interest groups. The second dimension puts emphasis on the contrast between 
federalism and unitary government. For the purpose of this examination it is not 
necessary to follow Lijphart’s analysis of the “quality of democracies” in detail. But, his 
examination makes clear that rules, regulations and institutions of a democracy shape the 
political system, the party system, and herewith, the behavior of political parties inside 
the system. Therefore, to understand and explain the BJP party s behavior, it is necessary 
to examine the foundations and fundamental patterns of India’s democracy.54 
Examining the foundation of India’s democracy means going back to India’s 
independence phase and analyzing the basic ideas of the Indian nation-state. With regard 
to the character of the BJP as a Hindu nationalistic party, it is sufficient to focus on an 
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analysis of the relationship of the Indian nation-state towards religion and Hinduism in 
principle, and examine how this relationship shaped the construction of India’s 
democracy. In addition, it is necessary to examine the major principles of India’s political 
system because they provide the framework for the country’s political parties and their 
behavior. 
1. The Idea of an Indian Nation-State and an Indian Nation 
At independence, one of the major tasks for the Indian National Congress (INC) 
was to build a nation by defining a national Indian identity. Yet, the direction of the new 
Indian nation state was not undisputed within the INC. According to Graham, “In 1947 it 
contained within its ranks representatives of three important intellectual groups with quite 
definite but divergent views of what form the new polity should take. Of these, the first 
wished to see India as a liberal-democratic state with a constitution that was both secular 
and parliamentary in character; the second hoped for the formation of a socialist state in 
which collectivist principles governed social and economic organization; and the third 
was working to realize a state which embodied Hindu traditions and values.”55 At last, 
the considerations of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were 
imposed on the formation of the Indian nation-state. 
Gandhi wanted to create a nation based on tolerance. He rejected any kind of 
nationalism based on history and preferred instead the higher values of morality 
composed of elements from different traditions and religions. Khilnani describes 
Gandhi’s idea as follows: “With unique sensitivity, he evoked a patriotic symbolism that 
allowed him to be visualized not merely as an all-Indian leader among the nationalist elite 
but as a local saint in the different regions and communities of India.”56 According to 
Brass, Nehru’s idea was to create a modern India with the cornerstones of: “sovereignty, 
unity, order, a strong state, secularism, democracy and parliamentarism, economic self-
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sufficiency and the need for social and economic reform.”57 Hansen adds that the new 
modern India was to be created on the basis of a common history of tolerance. “To 
Nehru, India was spirituality and a concomitant plurality and tolerance – which had 
eroded and degenerated from a golden Upanishadic Age to contemporary disarray – 
versus a materialist, individualized West.”58 
For Nehru, it became clear that an Indian nation state had a prosperous future only 
if it were to overcome the division of different cultures, religions, ethnicities and 
languages. Therefore, tolerance was a necessary means to ensure the independence and 
unity of the Indian nation and to form a national identity. According to Adeney, for 
Nehru, it was clear that in the long run, identities “… whether based on language, 
religion, or caste, were assumed to fade away with the onset of modernization.”59 
Therefore, the Indian state was formed as a liberal democracy with a constitution which 
ensured human rights and the freedom of religion.60 
But, the transfer to practice was, in part, not as clear as it seems on the first view. 
The term “secular” did not appear in the original Indian constitution. Only after 1976, did 
it become part of the constitution because secularism is not the same as tolerance. This is 
due to the fact that India’s secularism differs from the Western understanding of 
secularism. Gandhi’s and Nehru’s understanding of a secular state meant that the state 
had to be neutral in religious issues, yet it did not mean to separate the state from 
religion. The common Western understanding of a secular state often means that a state 
prevents any influence of religion on state affairs; in other words, a clear separation of 
state and religion. 
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This distinction between the Western understanding of secularism and India’s 
way of secularism is not just academic, but has consequences for political practice and 
the definition of an Indian identity. In India, this became obvious in the general debate 
about the term “Hindutva”61 and its importance for Hindu nationalists, as well as in the 
discussion about the representation of Muslims and Sikhs, and the status of the states of 
Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Although Article 2562 of the Constitution of India 
guarantees freedom of religion and together with Article 2663 determines India as a 
secular state, it emphasizes the special position Hinduism has in India. 
Nehru and his supporters (especially the “father” of the constitution, Bhimrao 
Ramji Ambedkar, a scheduled caste leader) built the constitution on the understanding of 
the tolerance of Hinduism and the belief that religion in India would not be dogmatic and 
would be a cornerstone of Indian society. According to Granville “Indians generally, and 
the Constituent Assembly members no less, believed that these attributes were both a 
historical truth and a continuing source of the nation’s strength, and they naturally 
applied them to constitution-making.” 64 In this sense, all religions were equal and had 
equal rights. But, Hinduism was considered not just a religion, but a way of life. With 
this, Hinduism cannot be excluded from the state or from politics. With this 
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understanding of secularism and Hinduism, it is comprehensible that the Indian 
constitution mentioned, in Article 25 especially, religious Hindu institutions which 
guaranteed the freedom of religion. But, because of the character of Hinduism as tolerant 
and non-missionary, Hinduism is, in the opinion of the majority of the Hindus, per se, 
secular. According to Hansen “The dominant interpretation of secularism in India did not 
entail the removal of religion from the political sphere, but rather the belief that religion 
and culture were elevated to an ostensibly apolitical level, above the profanities of the 
political.”65 
With this, the constitution laid ipso facto the basis for the debate about the role of 
Hinduism for the Indian nation, for its national identity, and for a discussion about the 
answer to the question, who is an Indian? And, it made the freedom of religious practice 
dependent on the future character of Hinduism. If Hinduism changes towards intolerance, 
the constitution of India might not be able to ensure the protection of religious minorities. 
In addition to this, the protection of minorities, by article 2966 and 3067 of the 
constitution, is as well ambiguous. Chatterjee argues that the difficulty is “… that the 
formal institutions of the state, based on an undifferentiated concept of citizenship, 
cannot allow for the separate representation of minorities. Consequently, the question of 
who represents minorities remains problematic, and constantly threatens the tenuous 
identity of nation and state.”68 As a legacy of partition, the Indian constitution ensures the 
protection of minorities in order to prevent riots, but it does not allow any special self-
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governing rights for religious groups, e.g., in Jammu and Kashmir. According to Adeney, 
the reason was the Indian strategy of nation building “… which perceived self-governing 
rights for religious communities to be problematic because of the perceived danger of 
secession: a legacy of partition.”69  
In a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic state as India, such an 
inconsistent constitutional construct raises questions and is the source of grievances. For 
example, Hindu nationalists question the status of the special autonomy rights of the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir and argue that these are, in fact, special religious rights for the 
Muslim majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. For Hindu nationalists, these special 
rights are an example of pseudo-secularism. On the other hand, the emphasis of 
Hinduism in the constitution is a source of grievances for religious minorities, a constant 
threat for their exercise of religion in India, and a hampering of the development of an 
Indian identity beyond any religion. 
As long as India is ruled by a strong party or party coalition on the national level, 
able to tie all social groups (including minorities) together and ensure adequate 
representation of all groups in the political process, these faults in the construction of 
India’s constitution will not have any major effect. But, in times when the state and the 
government are weak and if political entrepreneurs decide to exploit these fault lines for 
their own gain, it offers the opportunities for an escalation of grievances to agitations and 
political unrest and can destabilize the Indian nation. 
The principal course for India to deal with its diverse society can be defined as a 
politics of recognition.70 One cornerstone of this politics was to establish a federal system 
in India. In comparison to other countries, India’s grade of federalism is one of the 
highest.71 The reason for the creation of a federal system was to find a way of 
recognizing the plurality of different (linguistic, religious and ethnic) regional identities 
on the Indian subcontinent and integrating them in order to build a national identity. Yet, 
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adopting a federal system in principle contains three challenges. First it leads to the 
discussion about the distribution of power between the center and the states. This 
discussion can lead to conflict between the central authorities, who want to preserve a 
strong central power, and the states who want to strengthen their influence and increase 
political autonomy.72 Second, especially in multi-ethnic countries, this debate is 
combined with a discussion about specific (minority) rights for the states in order to 
preserve their local identities. This discussion is not just a discussion about local identity, 
but as well a debate about the importance of local identities in comparison to a national 
identity and can lead to the desire to separate a state from the union. However, data of 
Bermeo shows that despite the inherent conflicts, a federal system lessens the conditions 
that might spark violence between different ethnic groups. And, that no “… violent 
separatist movement has ever succeeded in a federal democracy.”73 But, the reason for 
this is less the federal system itself than the overarching interest of the nation-state to 
ensure territorial integrity. The center can ensure territorial integrity and the stability of 
the federal system by a policy of inclusion to manage ethnic or religious diversity or by 
force.74 Third, a federal system in a diverse society can increase the tendency to 
fragmentation, regionalization and factionalism if the different groups of the society are 
able to mobilize enough supporters to form a single party.75 Therefore, a federal system 
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a stable government. India’s federal system leads to a high number of political parties 
which operate partly just on the state level, and lessen the executive power of the 
centre.76 
According to Castells, “… a complex geometry emerges in the relationship 
between the state, social classes, social groups, and identities present in civil society.”77 
The mentioned challenges of discussions and conflicts about the role and the relationship 
between the central authority and the states and discussions about the importance of local 
and national identities are, in principle, an integral part of any federal system. Any 
federal government has therefore to develop adequate institutions and mechanisms to 
manage these discussions and conflicts. And, additionally, it needs a strong and stable 
central government to preserve the unity of the federal system without harming 
minorities. Unfortunately, the federal system does not support the formation of such a 
strong and stable government at the center. 
The Indian constitution, as the basis of the country’s federal system, tries to 
balance the various identities of Indian society. To prevent a development of religious 
identities on the state level, state boundaries were drawn in India along lines of linguistic 
boundaries. This was the main principle during India’s reorganizations in 1956, 1966 and 
2000.78 Furthermore, the constitution puts the focus on creating a strong central 
government and the build up of a common national identity. But, it shows some flaws by 
neglecting the establishment of institutions and mechanisms to balance conflicts between 
the center and the states. In addition to this, it offers the executive authority the 
opportunity to override the constitution. This led, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, to a 
de facto abolition of article 370 (which offers the State of Jammu and Kashmir special 
autonomy rights).  
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India is an “Electoral Democracy”79 with a democratic tradition since its 
independence in 1947. But this modern democratic state is only one side of the coin in 
India’s political system. The other side is marked by the limited downward reach of the 
state. But, most important, is the political society in India. Kohli argues that “Indian 
nationalists leaders mobilized various social classes into politics, which pushed a limited 
colonial state into a reactive mode. This modern but limited state was India’s fragmented-
multiclass state in the making, the product of both colonial state construction and 
pressures from Indians, especially the nationalist elite.”80 The result of this construction 
was a limited state capacity in combination with a relatively poor bureaucracy. Even 
when India’s democracy had proven its stability, democracy showed its vulnerability and 
dependence on individual actors and their political behavior. This offers a target for 
Hindu nationalist forces to challenge the central government by starting campaigns such 
as the campaign in Ayodhya and gave the BJP the opportunity to gain political 
advantages in the Hindu heartland. 
2. India’s Political System 
India is the largest democracy in the world. Its constitution provides human and 
minority rights, freedom of religion, and ensures free and fair elections. India’s political 
system follows the example set by the political system of Great Britain. India’s 
parliament consists of the Council of States or Rajya Sabha and the People’s Assembly or 
Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha is a body consisting of not more than 250 members up to 
twelve of whom are appointed by the president. The remainder is chosen by the elected 
members of the state and territorial assemblies. The members serve for a six-year term. 
The Lok Sabha has 545 seats. Two members of the Lok Sabha are appointed by the 
president. Five hundred and forty three are elected by popular vote in 543 constituencies 
by a first-past-the-post-system. The members serve for five-year terms. Chief of the state 
is the President. He is elected by an electoral college consisting of elected members of 
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both houses of Parliament and the legislatures of the states for a five-year term. Chief of 
the government is the Prime Minister. He is chosen by the members of Parliament (Lok 
Sabha) after the legislative elections. The cabinet is appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister. 
The political constellation of India differs from the political constellation in 
Western democracies. Political parties in India have been dominated mainly by political 
dynasties or interest groups. Inner party democracy is widely uncommon. The 
construction of and development towards a relatively weak state in India is combined 
with a highly competitive political party system. Elections are decided by the first-past-
the post system. Decisive for the success of a party in this system is just the number of 
votes a candidate receives in a district in comparison to his or her competitors. Only a 
few parties are represented in all India. Most parties represent individual groups of the 
society or have just a regional basis. In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, 230 parties were 
recognized, of that were six national parties and fifty-one state parties.81 To win elections 
and be successful in such a system is just possible if a party is able to mobilize masses of 
people. In the case of India, this often means consolidating and mobilizing groupings 
along cultural, ethnic or linguistic lines. Party identity is therefore often a means to 
mobilize voters and a precondition for party success in elections on the state level.82 As a 
result, the Lok Sabha consists of over forty parties and is highly fragmented.83 The 
emphasis of party identity along fault lines of society in combination with India’s federal 
system has led to a diversification of the political party system in India and strengthens 
the division of society.84 Or, according to Sridharan and Varshney, “Together, the 
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diversity and institutional features of the polity have created an increasingly plural-but 
not sharply polarized-party system at the national level. They have also led to a wide and 
often confusing array of political parties.”85 
Several reasons were supportive of this trend towards regionalism.86 Besides the 
decline of the Congress and the rising self-consciousness of marginalized groups87, the 
economic reforms of 1991 led to a sustainable rise in the multiparty system in India. In 
principle, they affected the power distribution between the center and the states in India 
by reducing the role of the national government in the economy. Therefore, industrial 
development and the shift of responsibility to the individual states marked a major shift in 
Indian federalism.88 The center lost power and the periphery gained power. 
This fragmentation in combination with a trend towards regionalism has led to the 
fact that most parties do not focus on national interests. Rather, their emphasis lies on 
representation of regional, sectoral or group interests. To gain political power in the 
states, group identities become more important than a national identity. Thus, domestic 
issues in India are predominant. Under these circumstances, forming a stable government 
by building a majority coalition is very difficult. Parties in India, which wanted to have a 
real chance in power participation had to win the support of different social groups, make 
compromises, and build coalitions. State politics became more important for political 
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parties. Political parties focus more on the situation of the individual state in order to 
participate in power. Small parties fill key positions in single states by establishing strong 
regional voter bases. Major parties which contest nation-wide have to adjust their 
behavior according to the public opinion of individual states in order to gain votes in the 
various states. Additionally, they are often dependent on smaller coalition partners in 
order to gain power in a state or to participate in power over a state.89 
The discussed development of India’s democracy and its party system shows the 
increasing difficulties in building social consensus and forming a stable government on 
the national level. But, according to Gowda, the effects of fragmentation have not been 
only negative. “This fragmentation of the party system from Congress dominance to 
multiparty coalition governments in India’s regionalized and ‘ethnicized’ party system 
has not undermined the basic power-sharing character of the system, and has thus helped 
to consolidate democracy.”90 Today, power sharing and the bargaining process for 
political goals is not only an internal matter of a single party but part of public discourse 
between different political parties. Additionally, coalition politics in India is maturing. 
Thakurta argues, “Coalitions, in spite of their ideological contradictions, are perhaps 
better equipped to deal with the tensions of such a divided society than single party 
governments that have a tendency to centralize and homogenize.”91 For instance, this has 
forced the BJP to accommodate its Hindu-nationalistic behavior when ruling India as 
senior partner of a coalition. 
However, India’s democracy shows some flaws when transferring democratic 
processes into political practice. Kohli mentions that “Personal rule has replaced party 
rule at all levels – national, state, and district. Below the rulers, the entrenched civil and 
police services have been politicized.”92 This judgment of the year 1990 is still true 
today. Political practice in India is often dominated by a patronage system and populism. 
Coalitions were not formed along the ideological orientation of political parties, but by 
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the promise of advantages and special incentives.93 Political decisions often followed the 
interests of some influential groups but not the necessities of the majority of the 
population or of the nation-state. The main problem in India’s democracy is still 
corruption. India’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008 is 3.4. Herewith, India ranks 
85 out of 180 countries.94 Transparency International India showed, in a 2005 study, that 
corruption in India was widespread and common in all parts of public services.95 
In addition to the problem of corruption, India’s democracy has to face additional 
problems. The Fund for Peace (a research and educational organization that works to 
prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war) argues that India is an effective 
democracy, but mentioned the police and the judiciary as sources for grievances. “The 
police have developed a reputation for corruption and have been accused of human rights 
violations. However, accountability is expected to improve with reforms. With a large 
population, insufficient funding, and lack of coordination, it is difficult for the judiciary 
to administer justice quickly enough. The justice system has a backlog of an estimated 
two million cases, many of which date back several years.”96 The poor reputation of the 
police and its propensity for corruption is a cause of worry. Because individual states are 
responsible for the police, a single state government, or a ruling political party can misuse 
the police for its own political purposes in the state without fearing a balancing central 
authority. In addition, Freedom House, an independent nongovernmental organization, 
argues that “Government effectiveness and accountability are also undermined by 
pervasive criminality in politics, decrepit state institutions, and widespread corruption.”97 
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As we will show later in this thesis, these flaws in India’s democracy helped the BJP to 
carry out the Ayodhya campaign and to impose Hindu nationalistic politics on the state 
level. 
3. Conclusion 
In sum, the design and construction of India’s democracy supports an ongoing 
discussion about the role and importance of Hinduism for the Indian nation. The constant 
discussions favor regional or ethnic politics in the states but oppose the development of a 
strong nationalistic Hinduism on the national level. 
The mentioned framework of India’s democracy has two major effects on the 
behavior of the BJP. 
First, the inconsistent construction of India’s constitution laid the basis for the 
debate about the character of Hinduism, its role for the Indian nation and for India’s 
national identity. With regard to the constitution, a Hindu nationalistic party can argue in 
favor of a dominant role of Hinduism for the Indian nation-state and against minority 
rights. This could lead to a constant threat for the exercise of religion in India, and 
hamper the development of an Indian identity beyond any religion. The guarantee of 
minority rights and protection of religious freedom depends on a strong state and 
powerful state institution. But, India’s federal system shifted power from the center to the 
states which make the center less able to guarantee minority rights. This means that a BJP 
government on the state level in Hindu nationalistic strongholds may more easily 
establish Hindu nationalistic policy because successful intervention of the center to 
ensure secularity in the states is less likely. 
Second, India’s federal system increases the tendency to fragmentation, 
regionalization and factionalism. Herewith, India’s political system favors politics 
oriented towards group interests, leads to polarization, and endangers the unity of the 
society. In general, political parties react to this tendency by creating strong party 
identities and emphasizing these identities to overcome the heterogeneity of society and 
to form a stable voter base for the party. This general trend is valid for political parties on 
the state level. But, political parties on the national level have to develop a two-fold 
strategy. Even if they create a strong party identity to gain power on the regional level, 
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they have to act more moderately on the national level because the fragmentation leads to 
an enhanced necessity for coalition building. Herewith, the fragmentation of India’s party 
system moderates the politics of the center, prevents extremist groups from coming into 
power and stabilizes democracy. Thus, in order to find coalition partners and to gain 
power on a national level or in states outside of the Hindu nationalistic strongholds, the 
BJP’s politics has to be moderate. 
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III. HINDU NATIONALISM IN INDIA 
In order to examine and to explain the BJP’s behavior, it is necessary to examine 
the foundations of the BJP. This foundation consists of three elements. The first is the 
party ideology. As mentioned in this thesis, a party’s ideology is decisive for the basic 
orientation of that political party. In case of the BJP, the party ideology is based on 
Hindutva, or Hinduness. But the term Hindutva as the foundation of the modern ideology 
of Hindu-nationalism cannot be understand without understanding the meaning of the 
basic term of Hinduism and its distinction from the term Indian nationalism. Therefore, 
the terms Hinduism and Indian nationalism will be explained first to set the stage for an 
understanding the Hindu nationalistic ideology of Hindutva. 
The second basis for any party’s behavior are collateral organizations which share 
a common basis with the political party and support the political party in exchange for 
gaining influence via the political parties. In case of the BJP, these collateral 
organizations are the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishva Hindu 
Parishad (VHP). Together they comprise the Sangh Parivar or the Hindu nationalistic 
network. The examination of the RSS and the VHP focuses on the stance of these 
organizations towards religious issues and the relationship between religion and the state 
to show the general character of these organizations. The third basis for party behavior is 
the heritage of connected social organizations or political parties. The BJP emerged from 
the ashes of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) when the party dissolved in 1979. Especially 
during the consolidation phase, the legacy of the BJS was decisive for the BJP. In sum, 
this chapter will explain the most relevant terms of Hindu nationalism and describe the 
Hindu Nationalist network in India to show the main Hindu political forces in India, their 
ties and connections, and their influence on the BJP. 
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A. BASIC TERMS 
1. Hinduism 
According to Oxtoby, “The term ‘Hinduism’ is largely a Western construct, a 
name given by outsiders to the majority religious heritage of the people of the Indian 
subcontinent.”98 This is one reason why defining Hinduism is not simple. The primary 
reason that Hinduism cannot be defined as easily is not only the term “Hinduism” but 
mainly the diversity and the non monotheistic character of Hinduism. In comparison to 
Christianity and Islam, Hinduism does not have a single founder. Instead, Hinduism 
developed in South Asia, over time, without any constraints of one overarching written 
scripture by a founder or an organization like the Christian church. Due to this fact, 
Hinduism is also very flexible. Also, it has a nonmissionary character. According to 
Stroup, Hindus do not proselytize. “Hinduism has taken over the centuries a “live and let 
live” attitude toward the question of who possesses the sole and final truth.”99 As a 
consequence, with this undogmatic and tolerant attitude, Hindus, over a long period of 
time, have not been able to develop a “collective Hindu consciousness.”100 
Hinduism’s flexibility also allows influences of different races, cultures and 
religions. The foundation for Hinduism probably lies in the time before 1,500 B.C.. The 
Hindus themselves call Hinduism an ancient and eternal religion (santana dharma). This 
unspoiled religious basis was changed because of the influence of immigrating groups, 
firstly the Aryans who came to India around 1,500 B.C. Hinduism emerged in a process 
of constant adjustment and formed itself as a rich and complex mixture of beliefs, 
symbols and practical religious realization of rites, festivals and worship. This is the 
reason for the development of different sub-directions and schools of Hinduism. And, 
because Hinduism is not highly organized, people are free to choose their way of 
Hinduism and spirituality with broad variations. 
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With this freedom of choice and the existence of different schools of thought and 
Hindu philosophies and its lack of fundamentals, contradictions and ambivalence in the 
understanding and practicing of Hinduism are inherent. Therefore, talking about 
Hinduism means talking about general characterizations of Hinduism while neglecting 
the detailed specifics of different schools of belief. One must know that individual 
practice can be very different. And, even when it is difficult to define Hinduism, it is as 
well difficult to define who is a Hindu. According to Oxtoby, “The Hindu Family Act 
says that it applies to anyone who belongs to one of the Hindu ‘denominations’… and ‘to 
any other person domiciled in the territories to which (the) act extends who is not a 
Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion.’”101 
To find, in the sense of this examination, important characterizations of religious 
beliefs, practices and traditions of Hinduism, one has to go back to the time frame of 
1,500 B.C. until 500 A.D. where most of the Vedic hymns (or hymns of the Veda102) 
were developed. The Vedic hymns are ritual texts which enclose the sacred and reveal 
basic knowledge (Vedic means knowledge) of Hinduism and were the first written source 
for standards, such as a code of conduct, of Hinduism. Together with later religious 
texts,103 they described the dharma104 (natural universal laws) which combines ethics 
and spiritual discipline that guide the people. The Veda builds the framework for rites and 
the first step for the development of a caste system by establishing the caste of priest 
(Brahmans - the sacred). And with this, they build the basis for the understanding of 
Hinduism as not simply a religion. Renou explains that rather “… Hinduism characterizes 
society as a whole. The caste system with its various “stages” of existence is part of 
Hinduism. Life is looked upon as a rite; there is no absolute dividing line between the 
sacred and the profane.”105 Altogether, Hinduism is the basis for the huge fragmentation 
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of Indian-Hindu society. Despite the above-mentioned inherent contradictions, Stroup 
identifies a common core of Hinduism which consists of five basic elements: “belief in 
god, reverence for the Vedas, the practice of rituals, certain ideas that govern life, and 
caste.”106 
Hinduism does not just set the rules for individual worship and the relationship 
between man and gods, rather it sets the frame for the social system in India as well.107 
The belief in Karma (doing or work) and reincarnation, for example, means that people’s 
intentions and deeds lead to punishment or reward after death and rebirth. Bad intentions 
or deeds are bad Karma and lead after death to a rebirth or reincarnation in a lower world 
or caste. Only the souls of those who rely on faith and are able to isolate the self or the 
soul from the world around will be liberated from rebirth and enter a new, higher 
stage.108 Thus, Renou characterises Hinduism “… as a system of the means appropriate 
for the attainment of Liberation.”109 The belonging to a caste is therefore a result of the 
life before reincarnation and the current life is, in this sense, only a phase in a continuing 
journey to liberation. With this, the caste system is essential for Hinduism as a religion as 
for the entire Indian society.110 Because of the close relationship between Hinduism and 
daily life, it is impossible to separate the realm of Hinduism from society and, therefore, 
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from the realm of politics.111 Even though India is a secular state, Hinduism and its 
traditions influence attitudes and actions of Indian politicians. Renou deduces that “An 
important consequence of this is tolerance, nonviolence considered an active virtue; this 
is a manner of acting which must be respected – even in the political sphere – regardless 
of the attitude of other.”112 In principle, this tolerant orientation of Hinduism hampered 
the BJP from imposing a dogmatic and centralized view of Hinduism with a dominating 
character. 
2. Indian Nationalism 
According to Khilnani, “‘Indian nationalism’ is a somewhat misleading shorthand 
phrase to describe a remarkable era of intellectual and cultural ferment and 
experimentation inaugurated in the late nineteenth century.”113 Depending on the point of 
view, “Indian nationalism” has different origins. First, one can find the origins of Hindu 
nationalism in the religion of Hinduism. At the end of the nineteenth century, a religious 
movement wanted to reform Hinduism and bring it back to the causes of traditional 
Hinduism. This religious movement was the basic motivation for many Indians to 
participate in the political sphere in order to put these ideas into practise. One example of 
this connection of religion and politics can be found in the person of Bal Gangadhar Tilak 
(1856–1920). Ashby tells about Tilak: “Frequently referred to as “the father of Indian 
Nationalism,” Tilak was a Maharastrian Brahman whose Hindu orthodoxy and Sanskrit 
learning gave him an authoritative religious voice, while his dedication to “Swaraj,” or 
political independence, at great personal sacrifice gave him a heroic status of great appeal 
to his countrymen.”114 Tilak wrote (1910-1911) a commentary to the Bhagavadgita, one 
of the most important religious scriptures of Hinduism. He had the opinion that it was not 
the nature of the Bhagavadgita to describe three or four different ways to redemption, 
rather, in his interpretation, for ordinary men, it is decisive to act in order to come closer 
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to the Divine. In his sense, acting means doing something for the welfare of all, but based 
on the ancient values of Hinduism which are the guidelines for any behavior. On the basis 
of this interpretation, Tilak opposed any foreign influence or western orientation. For 
him, true political and social independence of India were preconditions for establishing a 
capable Hindu government for the people of India. With this, Tilak marked the 
foundation for Indian-Hindu political and social activism. But, his interpretation of the 
Bhagavadgita stands in contrast to other interpretations, which emphasize not only action 
but the elements of knowledge, devotion and adoration in the Bhagavadgita as well. 115 
A second foundation of Indian nationalism can be found in the political sphere 
and the politics of the Indian National Congress (Congress). The Congress was founded 
in 1885. Firstly just an organization to improve the access of Indians to posts in the 
British administration of India, it became more and more political. And even the 
Congress was influenced by the ideas of Bal Gangadhar Tilak. He was a member of the 
Congress and used the Congress as a platform for spreading his ideas of Indian 
independence. But his political thoughts of using violent means to reach the goals of the 
Congress stood in opposition to the moderate views of other members of the Congress.116 
Under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi), the 
Congress, from 1920 on, became a mass movement of Hindus and Muslims. Despite of 
all struggles and rivalries inside the Congress (caste against caste, community against 
community etc.), the unifying idea for this mass movement was the common goal of 
ending British colonialism and gaining the independence of the subcontinent. 
By 1946, it became clear that the independence of the subcontinent would lead to 
two independent states. The Muslim League under the leadership of Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah was successful with its demand for founding an independent state called Pakistan 
for the areas with a Muslim majority.117 But even after the violent partition of Pakistan 
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and India, the idea of an Indian Nation was the unifying background for the Congress.118 
In combination with charismatic and clever leadership (Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru), 
this was the basis on which to establish the Congress as an organization that represented 
nearly all classes, castes, religions and ethnic groups.119 According to Varshney, the idea 
was that all “… religions (as well as languages and other groups) have an equal place in 
the national family and as a principle, none will dominate the functioning of the state.”120 
But, in 1947, it was not clear that this idea of a secular Indian nationalism would succeed 
over an ethno-religious mobilization of nationalism. Secularism became the norm for 
India’s political system and Hindu nationalism was marginalized.121 
The success of the Congress Party in the early years after Indian independence 
was based mainly on the capability of the Congress and its leaders to cover all the 
differences of the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-caste and multi-religious society of 
India with the overarching idea of the Indian nation under the umbrella of one 
organization.122 With this unifying idea of an Indian nation, Congress leaders created an 
Indian nationalism which appears to match the common definition of nationalism; 
however, some distinctions from nationalism are perceptible.123 Indian nationalism was, 
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until 1947, directed against the British and their rule over India. But after independence, 
Indian nationalism was a means to tie Indian citizens together in order to prevent further 
violent partitions, to ensure the development of a secular Indian democracy and to 
guarantee the continued existence of the nation state of India.124 The unifying power of 
Indian nationalism was in this sense not just a means to gain independence from Great 
Britain, but rather a precondition for developing a modern India.125 After gaining 
independence, Indian nationalism in the sense of Gandhi and Nehru, was a positive force 
for Indians, but never a force to be directed against others in India or outside of India. 
3. Hindutva 
a. Foundation and Characteristics 
“Hindutva – who is a Hindu” (Hindutva means Hinduness) was the name 
of a book published in 1923 written by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a colleague of Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak. With his book, the idea of a Hindu-Nation was first promulgated in 
public. It became, therefore, the foundation of the modern ideology of Hindu-
nationalism. “… Hindutva marked a qualitative change in Hindu nationalism, aspects of 
which had previously been combined in a loose ideology but which had now acquired a 
more systematic exposition.”126 In his book, Savarkar identified three cornerstones for 
the Hindu Nation. These are: rashta (common holy ground), jati (common blood) and 
sanskriti (common culture). For Savarkar, only Hindus have a claim to India as a nation 
because of the ancient common Hindu culture, history, language, and religion of India. 
He included in his theses thoughts of all kinds of Hindu sects, Buddhism, Jainism and 
Sikhs, but he excluded the Muslims of having ties to the holy land of India.127 Savakar’s 
ideas of Hindutva were similar to the Rassenideologie of the Nazis in Germany: 
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“Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having 
differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us 
in Hindustan to learn and profit by.”128 
Savarkar’s book had four major effects. First, Savarkar opposed the 
British rule over India and promoted a Hindu nation. With this, the concept of Hindutva 
not only propagated independence from the West but also provided a religious, cultural 
and social counter concept to Western ideas. Herewith, Hindu nationalism was a counter 
ideology to the idea of a rational secular Indian nationalism presented by Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi) and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.129 Second, with 
his definition of a common holy ground, he opposed partition of a Muslim Pakistan and 
claimed the entire subcontinent for the Hindus. Hinduism was to have the dominating 
role in the definition of the nation on the subcontinent. Third, by defining Hinduism 
through religion, he excluded other religions (except those with holy places placed on the 
common holy ground) from being Hindus, from making claims on the land of the Hindus, 
and from being part of the Hindu society in the Hindu state. With this, Muslims and 
Christians had no right to active participation in society and politics. They were to 
become second-class citizens and be dominated by the Hindus.130  
Finally, the concept of Hindutva had an effect on the Hindu part of the 
society as well. This became clear when the Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), started a campaign in 1990 against the results of the Mandal Commission 
report. This report recommended measures to improve the representation of lower and 
“Other Backward Classes” (OBCs) in public administration. On the one hand, Hindu 
nationalists were against the recommendation of the Mandal Commission because it was 
seen as “… highly divisive of the ‘Hindu community’ because it pitted lower castes 
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against upper, and because caste identity is more strongly felt than religious identity.”131 
On the other hand, Hindutva ensured exactly the opposite by focusing on a Hindu society 
with a traditional structure with caste dominance.132 The BJP was in opposition to these 
recommendations and started the campaign for the Ram temple in Ayodhya. With this 
“religious” campaign, Hindu nationalists were able to cover up the negative 
consequences of the refusal of their Mandal Commission with a high moral campaign.133 
b. Legal Position 
Contrary to Savarkar’s thoughts about a Hindu nation, the preamble of the 
Indian constitution defines India as a secular state. Furthermore, Article 25 of the 
Constitution of India guarantees the freedom of religion and together with Article 26 
determines India as a secular state. In addition to this, articles 29 and 30 ensure the 
protection of minorities. But, as shown, the Indian idea of secularism differs from the 
idea of secularism in Western countries.  
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in several cases, 
judged the meaning of the terms “Hinduism” and “Hindutva.” In 1966, it decided that 
Hinduism and Hindutva are not unambiguous definable and cannot be explained as 
religious terms. They argued that the Hindu civilization got its name in ancient times 
following the name of the river Sindhu (now Indus) were civilization settled. With this, 
Hindu and Hinduism had initially a geographical, not a religious foundation. Hinduism 
itself is not only a religion but also a philosophy with diverse forms of belief which 
tolerate other ways of thinking and beliefs. And, Hindutva describes a way of life rather 
than a term of religious Hindu nationalism.134 Last, in 1995, the judges of the Supreme 
Court ruled consistently with the decision of 1966. 
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Thus, it cannot be doubted, particularly in view of the Constitution Bench 
decisions of this Court that the words `Hinduism’ or `Hindutva’ are not 
necessarily to be understood and construed narrowly, confined only to the 
strict Hindu religious practices unrelated to the culture and ethos of the 
people of India, depicting the way of life of the Indian people. Unless the 
context of a speech indicates a contrary meaning or use, in the abstract 
these terms are indicative more of a way of life of the Indian people and 
are not confined merely to describe persons practicing the Hindu religion 
as a faith. 
Considering the terms `Hinduism’ or `Hindutva’ per se as depicting 
hostility, enmity or intolerance towards other religious faiths or professing 
communalism, proceeds from an improper appreciation and perception of 
the true meaning of these expressions emerging from the detailed 
discussion in earlier authorities of this Court. Misuse of these expressions 
to promote communalism cannot alter the true meaning of these terms.135 
This decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court gave Hindu 
nationalists an opportunity to use the terms “Hinduism” and “Hindutva” officially in the 
secular sense, but also subliminally, as a means to exclude, especially, Indian Muslims in 
the sense of the thoughts of Savarkar. And Nauriya argues that “… the judgments reflect 
a growing tendency towards appropriation of the BJP-RSS conceptual framework by 
state institutions.”136 
B. THE HINDU NATIONALIST NETWORK (SANGH PARIVAR) 
1. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (Association of National Volunteers) 
is a Hindu nationalist organization, founded in 1925 by Keshava Baliram Hedgewar as a 
culture and welfare organization with the intention of promoting the idea of a Hindu 
nation on the basis of the Hindutva.137 This original character of the RSS changed over 
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time under the leadership of Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar who led the RSS from 1940 
until 1973. He escalated the thoughts in Savarkar’s book about Hindutva by defining the 
nation state referring to Hinduism. For him, not the borders of a state marked the 
boundaries of citizenship, but the affiliation with Hinduism. Therefore, he founded RSS 
as a social organization for Hindus. With this religious context, he excluded Muslims and 
Christians explicitly from being citizens of India, denying them the same rights as Hindu 
citizens. For him, one shining example in distinguishing between different citizens was 
Germany, under the Nazi rule.138 Golwalkar and the RSS tried to construct a new Hindu 
identity which would overcome what they considered to be one of the traditional 
weaknesses of Hinduism, its passiveness and its disaccord. One of the means to this end 
could be disciplined violence.139 Also, the idea for a separate Muslim nation had already 
begun by this time, led by a political poet Iqbal who became a presidential candidate in 
1930. 
Paradoxically for western observers, Golwalkar, as well as Savarkar and 
Hedgewar, saw no contradiction between the call for violence and the tolerant nature of 
Hinduism. They saw the preparation for violent actions as a necessary means to 
demonstrate Hindu strength and be prepared in case of attacks from others.140 Golwalkar 
argued that violence is necessary just to defend Hindus and Hinduism against such 
attacks. And, in this sense, all violent actions of Hindu nationalists were and are justified 
by pointing out actions of others, even in the ancient past, which are judged as attacks 
leading to counteraction by Hindu nationalists. In the sense of Hindu nationalists, their 
violence is nothing more than self-defense.141 
Hindu nationalists argue that Hindus are in a constant stage of self-defense. Their 
main arguments are summarized as follows: First, they point out that Christianity and 
Islam are unable or unwilling to acknowledge other religions as equal. The website of the 
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RSS, for example, blamed the Pope for not signing a declaration considering all religions 
equal.142 Second, they refer to the proselytizing, and therefore offensive character of 
Christianity and Islam as a constant threat for Hindus and Hinduism. They view the 
Muslims in India as part of a pan-Islamic front and therefore as a constant threat for a 
secular India. Third, they highlight the fact that many countries in the world can be 
called Christian or Islamic, but only Hinduism is tied to India and the holy ground of the 
Indian subcontinent. With this, they argue that in case of a threat, Christians and Muslims 
have the opportunity to leave India and settle in another Christian or Muslim country. In 
contrast to this, Hindus do not have such an opportunity because India is the holy ground 
of Hinduism and the only Hindu country in the world. So, Hindus are not able to retreat, 
they have to fight for their Hindu nation and Hindu state. Fourth, the threat by Muslims 
in India is real and constant. It is not only expressed by terrorist actions but as well by the 
increase of the Muslim population in connection with a number of mass conversions to 
Islam. But, most important, they mention the rise of minority rights and a number of 
decisions143 of the Indian government which have led to special provisions for the 
Muslims but neglected, in the opinion of the Hindu nationalists, the rights of the Hindu 
majority of India.144 
                                                 
142 “As for Christianity or Islam, we desire that they too should fall in line of accepting the validity of 
other religions. The Millennium Peace Summit, which was held in New York in August 1999, adopted a 
declaration that they consider all religions equal. … . Surprisingly His Holiness the Pope struck a 
discordant note and declared that the Roman Catholic Church cannot accept other religions as equal. We 
wonder whether this is in consonance with the fundamentals of our constitution.” Cited on Rashtria 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), “The RSS Position on Minorities,” 
http://www.rss.org:8080/New_RSS/Mission_Vision/RSS_on_Minorities.jsp (accessed January 01, 2009). 
143 One of these decisions happened in 1985/1986 and was called the “Shah Bano affair.” Shah Bano, 
a 62-year-old Muslim woman and mother of five children was divorced by her husband in 1978. Because 
she did not have any means to support herself and her children, she approached the courts for securing 
maintenance from her husband. In 1985, the case reached the Supreme Court. It ruled that Shah Bano had 
to be given alimony. The orthodox Muslims in India felt threatened at what they perceived was an 
encroachment of Muslim Personal Law, and protested against the judgment. They protested by large 
numbers. As a reaction, to this, the Congress ruled government enacted a law with which alimony 
provisions for Muslim women were, in conformity with the Sharia, abolished. With this action, the 
government wanted to prevent riots by the Muslims. Congress did not want to lose the Muslim votes for the 
next election. But the decision of the Congress government led at the same time to dissatisfaction on the 
side of the Hindus. They feared a rise of traditional Islamic power in India and an increase of minority 
rights, especially when these minorities threatened violence. 
144 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, 338-368, Sumanta Banerjee, “Hindutva – 
Ideology and Social Psychology,” Economic and Political Weekly 26, no. 3 (1991), 98-99. Peter van der 
Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1994), 25-33. 
 58
In the opinion of Hindu nationalists, the apparent rise of minority rights was a 
sign of betrayal by the Indian government under the rule of the Indian National Congress 
(Congress) of the Hindu majority in India. With this argument, Hindu nationalists built 
up a chain of arguments whith a religious starting point (Hinduism). These arguments 
define on this basis the nation and state, and conclude that only politics for the majority 
(of the Hindus) is legitimate for the (Hindu) state. But, today, this chain of arguments is 
not as obvious as it was at the time of Golwalkar. Today’s RSS website uses the same 
definition of Hinduism as used by the Constitution Bench of Indian Supreme Court: “It 
should be noted that the Hindu Code Bill, though it contains the word ‘Hindu,’ is 
applicable to Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists. We desire that it should be applicable to all, 
including the Christians and the Muslims, as is envisaged in Article 44 of our 
constitution. The basic postulate is that ‘Hindu’ is not a religion but a way of life, or more 
precisely a certain value-system or culture. One of the basic tenets of this value system is 
to accept the validity of all faiths and religions. If we deny this plurality, we will cease to 
be Hindus.”145  
But even with this broader definition of Hinduism, Hindu nationalists still demand 
that Hinduism, and its historical, cultural and religious traditions, should be the 
foundation for the Indian nation and the Indian nation state. The Hindu nationalist 
argument for self-defense is a call for equality of religions, but more importantly, a 
demand for India as a state of Hindus and for Hindus. This becomes clearer when one 
reads the statement of the RSS regarding minority rights: “The RSS is not against any 
religion, but some religions are extremely intolerant of other religions. Why could 5% 
Hindus not live with dignity and honor in the Kashmir valley?”146 With this argument, 
the RSS is not against Islam officially, but for Hindus and the rights of the majority. And 
the RSS has been able to change to a more moderate rhetoric because it has “… steadily 
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burrowed its way into the pores of civil society in many parts of the country.”147 And, 
additionally, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as its partner it has a strong arm in the 
political sphere. 
2. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 
The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP - World Hindu Council) was founded in 
August 1964 on the initiative of Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. Golwalkar recognized that 
the RSS was mainly a social and political organization of Hindu nationalists, but had no 
link to religious Hindu groups. In order to compensate for this flaw, he started the 
initiative to build the VHP. According to Hansen, the VHP “… was intended to provide a 
bridge between the religious establishment and the RSS.”148 The aim of the VHP was to 
offer all religious Hindu groups in India and abroad a forum for their common interests. 
The common ground was to be the thoughts of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and the RSS 
ideology of Hinduism. By establishing such an institution, Golwakar hoped to strengthen 
Hinduism and to overcome its weakness of religious diversity. The main objectives of the 
VHP were to “ (1) … to consolidate and strengthen the Hindu society. (2) To protect, 
develop and spread the Hindu values of life – ethical and spiritual. (3) To establish and 
reinforce contacts with and help all Hindus living abroad. (4) To welcome back all who 
had gone out of the Hindu fold … (5) To render social service to humanity at large … (6) 
… to revitalise the eternal Hindu Society by rearranging the code of conduct of our age-
old Dharma … (7) To eradicate the concept of untouchability from the Hindu society.”149 
In order to reach these objectives, the VHP had a strong organizational structure 
which covered all parts of India and reached every village. On the foundation of this 
organization, the VHP developed many different activities. These activities were 
comprised of the building of temples, schools, libraries and hospitals, the organization of 
campaigns, events, processions and sacrificial ceremonies, and several kinds of social 
                                                 
147 Vanaik, Communalization of Indian Polity, 182. 
148 Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, 101. 
149 “Messages and Activities,” VHP pamphlet, New Delhi, 1982 cited from van der Veer, Religious 
Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India, 130. 
 60
activities. With this, the VHP did not obtain just attention and support of the people, but 
was as well able to organize and mobilize the masses for its purposes.150 
In addition to this, the VHP tried to change the diversity of Hinduism by creating 
a common basis for Hinduism. One of its means was the demand for the abolition of the 
untouchables. A second one was to institute the opportunity to convert from Islam to 
Hinduism. A third one was the creating of a Hindu code of conduct (Achar Samhita). 
Finally, the VHP tried to establish one common ceremony (Ekatamata Yatras) for all 
Hindus to worship the “mother goodness” of India (Bharat Mata).151 At the core of this 
ceremony were two processions (Yatra) through India. With these, the VHP not only 
tried to establish a new characteristic of a unified Hinduism. More importantly, the 
symbol they created to serve as a means to unify the Hindus was one which represented 
the RSS ideology as well. It became clear that the VHP was in fact not just a religious 
organization, but used religious means for political purposes.152 The processions 
organized by the VHP had different success in mobilizing the people. In South India, the 
success was not clear. But, in the Hindu strongholds they were a successful means to 
promote the ideology of the VHP by using religious symbols. 
The VHP is an important brick in the building of the Hindu nationalist network 
because it promotes Hindu nationalism under the guise of religion. Jaffrelot argues that 
with this, the “… Vishva Hindu Parishad became the spearhead of Hindu militancy at the 
beginning of the 1980s.”153 The organizational structure gave the VHP the strength to 
mobilize masses154 without thinking about the political constraints of secularism in India. 
Officially, outside the political sphere, the VHP acts as a support both for the ideological 
ideas of the RSS and for the political representatives of the Hindu nationalist 
movement.155 
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C. THE LEGACY OF THE BHARATIYA JANA SANGH (BJS) 
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS – Indian People’s Union) was founded in 1951 by 
Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, a former member of the Hindu nationalistic party, Hindu 
Mahasabha (HMS), and minister for industry under the Nehru government until 1951.156 
Officially independent, the BJS was strongly tied to the RSS. The RSS was the 
ideological and organizational base and the source for recruitment of personnel for the 
BJS. As a countermove, the BJS gave the RSS the opportunity to act politically and to 
spread its ideas even in times when the RSS was banned. With this, the BJS could be 
named as the political wing of the RSS.157 
According to Baxter, the political program of the BJS was based strictly on RSS 
ideology. “The Jana Sangh stated its “fundamentals” as “one country, one nation, one 
culture and the rule of law.”“158 With this nationalistic position, the BJS was a clear 
opponent of Pakistan and of the efforts of some regions like Jammu and Kashmir to gain 
independence. In addition to this, the concentration on Hinduism in combination with the 
rejection of minority rights led to the fact that the BJS could not compete with the INC 
and was not attractive to a majority of the people.  
The BJS gained a stronger base of supporters in the middle class and in the small-
scale business class. According to Graham, the BJS saw “… organizational principles of 
small industries were in harmony with Indian social tradition and that they were the best 
means of providing employment and producing consumer goods.”159 This policy was not 
only ideology-based it was also a counter-strategy to the Congress which was supported 
                                                 
156 For the origins of the BJS, see Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics, 5-42. 
157 “Yet throughout the late 1950s and the 1960s it was handicapped, firstly by the suspicion that it 
was closely tied to, if not dependent upon, the RSS hierarchy and its organizational headquarters at Nagpur, 
secondly by its reputation for being an extremist body, with intolerant views on relations between Hindus 
and other religious communities, and, thirdly, by the inexperience and relative obscurity of its leadership.” 
Ibid., 54. See as well Craig Baxter, The Jana Sangh; a Biography of an Indian Political Party 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), 6-80; Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and 
Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, 126-131; Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, 114-
132 and 149-157. 
158 Baxter, The Jana Sangh; a Biography of an Indian Political Party, 84. For details about the 
development of the BJS, its party program and the relationship between the BJS and the RSS, see Graham, 
Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics, 43-93. 
159 Ibid., 159. 
 62
by large-scale industry. The BJS tried to gain support from urban groups, small 
industrialists, traders, and the middle class in order to broaden its voter base and close 
itself off from the Congress. But this counter-strategy towards the Congress was limited 
to certain areas. For example, in 1962 the BJS changed its manifesto and opposed the 
“Nehru-proposed joint cooperative farming program of the Congress.”160 However, 
overall, the main direction of BJS’s interest group politics was directed towards the 
middle class and the small-scale business class. On the one hand, this strategy ensured the 
BJS a broader voter base (which was, later on, the voter base for the BJP as well) and 
financial support, but on the other hand, it limited the support to a relatively small group 
and excluded the majority of the population. The reason for this was the dominance of the 
Congress along with the limitations of the BJS’s ideology to attract all groups of the 
society. For example, BJP’s ideology treated the employees and the employers of small-
scale industry as one cohesive group with one common interest. Herewith, it neglected 
the existence of class struggles and major differences between different social groups.161 
Therefore, the election results of the BJS did not meet the expectations of the 
party officials. In 1954, The BJS won, from a total of 489 seats in the Lokh Sabah, 3 
seats; in 1957, from 494 seats, won 4; in 1962, from 494 seats, won 14; in 1967, from 
520, won 35; and in 1971, from 518, won 22. With these results, the BJS was an 
opposition party only and never gained power over India. Only in the northern part of 
India, the Hindu homeland, was the BJS able to gain power in a coalition with other 
parties for a short period of time.162 
Only when the Congress appeared weak, in 1977, after ruling India for thirty 
years and for several more reasons was no longer able to convince the people that it was 
the party of all India and all Indians,163 could the BJS join power in a coalition with other 
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parties and cease to exist. The partners of this alliance together formed a new party, 
called the Janata Party. Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Minister of External Affairs and Lal 
Krishna Advani the Minister for Home Affairs.164 The Janata party was less a party with 
its own voter base than an alliance of different parties with normally incompatible single 
aims. The only reason for them to build a coalition was to drive Congress from power.165 
Because of the heterogeneity of the alliance, the Janata party could remain in power only 
a short time. But, that time gave the representatives of the BJS the opportunity to have 
experience with ruling a government and rethinking their strategy to gain power.166 After 
the breakdown of the Janata party, the former members of the BJS founded the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP – Indian People’s Party) in 1980. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The depiction of Hinduism and Indian nationalism shows how interwoven 
religious, social and political issues are in India. Because it is never easy to differentiate 
political aspects from religious aspects, it is very easy for Hindu nationalists to use 
religious feelings for political purposes. In this sense, Hindu nationalism is a product of 
different Hindu sentiments in combination with an exploitation of religious issues. Hindu 
nationalists would argue that Hindu nationalism’s aim was to transform Hinduism from a 
(in comparison with other religions) subordinate status into a status of equality by 
strengthening Hinduism and abolishing its weaknesses. Gandhi’s idea of a “feminized 
patriotism”167 should be removed by an interpretation of virility and masculinity for the 
Hindu nation. And, they would emphasize the character of Hinduism not as a religion but 
as a way of life with distinctive features in comparison with other religions and ways of 
life. As Hansen argues, “India’s spiritual superiority and the universal mission of Hindu 
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philosophy to be a “spiritual corrective” to a materialistic and overly rationalist western 
world remains a cornerstone in contemporary Hindu nationalism.”168 
Additionally, the discussion about the role of Hinduism and the term “Hindutva” 
shows the flaws of India’s constitution to ensure secularism in the sense of Gandhi and 
Nehru. Hindu nationalists were able to re-interpret the constitution and establish an 
ambiguous view on secularism. Their interpretation of secularism gave the RSS and the 
VHP the opportunity to use religious issues for political purposes, and tried to change the 
interpretation of “who is an Indian” from a broader Gandhian interpretation to a narrow 
interpretation in the sense of Savarkar. Hindu nationalists used any flaw in India’s 
political system as a means for political maneuvering, to mobilize masses, and to exclude 
minorities from being considered true Indian citizens. But, this discussion is not just a 
discussion about citizenship. Rather, it is more the attempt of Hindu nationalists to 
change the identity of the Indian nation and the nation-state. 
Furthermore, the depiction of the characteristics of the RSS and VHP show the 
strength of the organizational power of the Sangh Parivar. Based on a strong ideology 
and provided with a strong leadership, the forces of the Sangh Parivar were able to 
intersect all parts of society and to reach every village. This ensures power and influence 
on society in a broad spectrum. The example of the BJS shows the significance of the 
influence the Sangh Parivar has, as a collateral organization, on a political party. The 
Sangh Parivar and the BJS shared the same ideological basis, had the same goals, and 
were comprised of the same personnel. As the political arm of the RSS, it was the aim of 
the BJS to transform Hindutva–ideology into the political realm and to set the stage for a 
political change of India’s national identity. 
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IV. BJP’S POLITICS 
This chapter examines the BJP’s politics in more detail. The examination consists 
of the historical development of the BJP and two case studies. 
The examination of the BJP’s politics over a time frame of twenty-eight years 
describes continuities and discontinuities in its behavior to discover the core character of 
the BJP as a predictor of future behavior. The depiction of the BJP’s politics will examine 
different phases of the BJP’s politics, which mark the shifts and changes of the BJP when 
influenced by different social forces. 
In addition, two case studies show the BJP’s politics and behavior in two 
prominent examples. The Ayodhya case is an example of how the BJP behaved in the 
domestic sphere and how Hindu nationalism influenced its behavior. In addition, the 
Kashmir case demonstrates how domestic politics and Hindu nationalism may influence 
the behavior of a government in an issue with relevance for international relations. The 
conclusions of both subparts of this chapter consist of an explanation of each case. These 
explanations show which factors influenced the BJP’s behavior and led to certain 
political actions of the BJP. They also make clear how Hindu nationalism influences 
politics in India in general. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings of the examination. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP) 
POLITICS 
1. The BJP as Opposition Party 1980–1998 
a. The Consolidation Phase (1980–1984) 
The elections of 1980 brought the Congress back to power. The Janata Dal 
broke apart, and the successor parties were marginalized. After the founding of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the party leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, preferred a 
moderate course for the BJP. He tried to present the BJP as the successor of the Janata 
Party and as a democratic alternative to the Congress. The BJP softened a lot of its 
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fundamentalistic rhetoric, downplayed the connection to the RSS and argued that it was 
Vajpayee’s goal to bring the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi back into politics.169 
According to Malik, the reason for the dissociation from the Bharatiya Jana Party (BJS) 
was the limited voter base of the BJS. “The revival of the Jana Sangh would have been a 
step backward because its support base was confined to the high caste, urban middle class 
of the Hindi-speaking states of north and central India.”170 In order to be competitive and 
gain voters, the BJP had to broaden its voter base geographically and demographically 
without losing the support of its Hindu nationalistic voter base.171 “To further modify the 
radical thrust of militant Hindu nationalism, the BJP leadership also committed itself to 
nationalism and national integration, democracy, positive secularism, and value-based 
politics. These five commitments were stressed as the striking features of the new party, 
distinguishing it from the Congress.”172 
But, this moderate course of the BJP was not undisputed inside the BJP 
and among the members of the Hindu nationalistic network. The BJP hardliners were 
afraid of the BJP losing its Hindu nationalistic identity, therefore losing its main 
supporter base and creating dependence on unreliable partners in electoral alliances. This 
dispute set the tone for the inner party struggles of the BJP during the next twenty years. 
For Basu, it is the debate and the contradiction of the two different identities of the BJP: 
“as militant social movement and moderate political party.”173 
However, the election of 1984 was a debacle for the BJP which won only 
two seats in the Lok Sabha. One reason for this was the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 
1984, and the wave of sympathy for the Congress in the aftermath of the incident. Public 
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opinion changed in the same way it had changed after the assassination of Mahatma 
Gandhi, into full support of the Congress. With this support, the Congress won 403 
seats.174 
After the debacle of 1984, the BJP changed course again. The BJP 
analysis of the 1984 election showed that it was not only the wave of sympathy in the 
aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, which led to the loss of voters for the BJP. 
Another reason was the lack of a clear party profile for the BJP. Even in the Hindu 
heartland, the BJP was not able to mobilize the Hindu nationalistic voter base as a 
majority.175 
b. BJP as a Political Arm of the RSS (1984–1992) 
The BJP had tried in the years before the 1984 election, to be a better 
Congress, but this had made the party into a duplicate of the Congress. The voters wanted 
a BJP with its own profile, even if this were an ideological one. The change of the BJP 
after the 1984 election involved several organizational, training and programmatically 
aspects. While the BJP had acted in the past as one block, after the 1984 change the party 
built up different sub-organizations in order to reach every single group of the population 
by using specific channels. In addition to this, the BJP intensified ideological training of 
cadres to form a foundation and an instrument for spreading its ideas. The task for these 
cadres was to intensify the cooperation with other Hindu nationalistic organizations like 
the RSS and the VHP. Programs and campaigns to promote agitation built the third 
column of the new BJP to strengthen the profile of the party. 176 
Under the new leadership of Lal Krishan Advani, the BJP went back to the 
old RSS and VHP rhetoric. With this new combination of Hindu religious and 
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nationalistic agitation177 they were able to expand their power base and won 89 seats in 
the 1989 Lok Sabha election and became the third strongest party in the Lok Sabha.178 
They supported the minority government of the national front under Prime Minister V.P. 
Singh. But, in 1990, when Singh decided to arrest Advani because of his participation in 
the Ayodhya campaign, the BJP withdrew its support for the National Front. 
Likewise, in 1990, the BJP started a campaign against plans for realization 
of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission report by the government of Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh. This report recommended measures to improve the representation of 
lower and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in public administration. On the one hand, 
Vanaik argues that the BJP was against the recommendation of the Mandal Commission 
because it was seen as “… highly divisive of the ‘Hindu community’ because it pitted 
lower castes against upper, and because caste identity is more strongly felt than religious 
identity.”179 On the other hand, Aloysius argues that “… the Hindutva political 
mobilization is a concrete demonstration of as to how the masses can be kept under the 
traditional caste-dominance …”180 The primary reason for refusing the recommendations 
of the Mandal Commission was the voter base of the BJP. The BJP was mainly supported 
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In order to cover this negative attitude towards an improvement of the 
position of other castes that formed the majority of the population, the BJP intensified the 
campaign for the reconstruction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya.183 But this was not the 
only reason for the Ayodhya campaign. The legend of Ram and the story of the temple of 
Ram in Ayodhya were very popular and widespread in India. For the Hindu nationalists, 
both the fight against the use of the Babri mosque as a mosque, and for construction of a 
Hindu temple at the birthplace of Ram was a logical continuation of a centuries old fight 
of Hindus against Muslims. Because of this, Ram was the ideal figure for Hindu 
identification. The religious diversity of Hinduism was reduced by making Ram a symbol 
of Hinduism and national unity.184 With this “religious” campaign, Hindu nationalists 
were able to cover up the negative consequences of their refusal of accepting Mandal 
Commission recommendations with a high moral campaign.185 These domestic reasons 
for the Ayodhya campaign were combined with BJP pressure on the national government 
for continuation of the politics towards Jammu and Kashmir.  
The dispute about Kashmir is one example of tensions between Pakistan 
and India. This critical relationship was one reason for the BJP to demand an increase of 
defense expenditures, to modernize the armed forces and improve the links between 
armed forces and government. Likewise, with regards to Pakistan and the nuclear threat, 
the BJP demanded nuclear weapons for India’s armed forces. For the BJP, it was 
unacceptable to put India under the nuclear umbrella of any super power because then 
India would be dependent on this protection and could not act as independently (and 
strongly) as Hindu nationalists wished India should. But, at the same time, the BJP 
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favored steps towards normalization of the relations with Pakistan and China. However, 
the BJP criticized Pakistani support for “anti national” elements in Jammu and Kashmir 
and terrorists in Punjab. Normalization of foreign policy means, in the sense of the BJP, 
developing a unique Indian position of strength and representing this position with self-
confidence in the political arena. In general, this position is similar to the position of the 
Congress. But the degree of call for “absolute” independence is higher in the BJP in 
comparison to the Congress.186 
Also, in 1991, the BJP introduced an important change to the party profile 
to be more attractive for non-Hindu nationalistic voters. For the 1991 elections, economic 
issues came into the focus of party politics. Until 1991, the BJP supported the Congress’ 
course of interventionism and a closed economy, but in 1991 they changed course 
towards a liberal market.187 With this shift in party politics, the BJP became more 
attractive for middle class voters who had suffered from the fiscal and political crises of 
the 1980s. Herewith, the BJP followed the shift that the Congress carried out. The shift in 
the economic orientation of the party led to discussions within the Hindu nationalistic 
network but was not seen as a contradiction to the Hindu nationalistic orientation of the 
party and was compatible with BJP’s party identity.188 Even more, according to Malik, 
the BJP leadership argued that India’s economic problems were caused by the Congress 
because its “… plan for economic development was borrowed from abroad, and so had 
no cultural relevance to the country.”189 Despite the more liberal economic course, this 
statement shows the borders for the BJP politics and its ambivalence. For the BJP liberal 
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markets meant primarily to liberalize the domestic market, but did not mean to integrate 
India fully into the globalized world economy. The BJP ideology of self-determination 
and self-reliance even in economics prevented a further development of the BJP about 
economic issues.190 
In the 1991 elections, the BJP won 120 seats and became the strongest 
opposition party.191 The BJP formed governments in four states in northern India and 
was able to gain ground in some states of the south. This expansion was furthered by a 
shift in the political system of India by which the state became more important for policy 
making. On the one hand, Yadav argues that this meant that “… there is now greater 
space and incentive for state-level political formations to emerge.”192 In principle, this 
meant an increasing number of parties on the state level and a decline of the Congress 
which lost the ability to be the unifying power for all groups of society. On the other 
hand, this development at the state level established the BJP as the second nationwide 
political power besides the Congress. The BJP “… was catapulted to the centre stage by 
the events of 1989–91.”193 This marked the end of the one-party dominance in India. The 
Ayodhya campaign gave the BJP a distinguished image, brought it into the national 
limelight and made it competitive. The BJP was now able to change the emphasis of its 
election campaign to be dependent on the composition of the voters in the single states. In 
states of the Hindu heartland, the BJP could focus on Hindu nationalistic topics, in other 
states the focus might change to economic themes. According to Vanaik, the BJP “… has 
been so positioned as to be the most likely beneficiary of the decline not just of the 
Congress but of the politics of old centrism.”194 
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Besides an incompetent leadership of the Congress, one major reason for 
the success of the BJP during this time was its ability to mobilize the Hindu electorate by 
focusing on a common Hindu spirit. The BJP used the Ayodhya campaign to show its 
own strength and the weakness of its political opponents. Although 35% of all Hindus 
(and 24% of all Muslims) blamed the BJP for the demolition of the mosque, most Hindus 
(47%) and the majority of Muslims (73%) were of the opinion that the Congress-ruled 
national government was responsible for the destruction of the mosque.195 And, even the 
violence at Ayodhya was used by BJP leaders for their own purposes. Officially, they 
denounced the riots and claimed no responsibility for them and their deadly results.196 At 
the same time, however, the BJP justified violence by blaming the old government for 
being responsible for the comprehensible rage of the suppressed Hindus. Although the 
president of the BJP, Lal Krishna Advani, was at the site of the Babri mosque on that date 
and was accused of causing the demolition of the mosque, he never was convicted. 
Vanaik argues that “In a narrowly partisan sense, the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi 
Ayodhya campaign did for the Sangh and the BJP what the Dandi Salt March did for the 
Congress-led national movement.”197 
The negative consequence of the Ayodhya campaign was that it limited 
the BJP’s opportunities to get a majority of the voters. Although the BJP was able to 
appeal to a high percentage of the Hindu voters with the Ayodhya campaign, at the same 
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time it kept the OBCs away from the BJP.198 But, the OBC’s were the most important 
voter group for gaining power in India. 
b. Preparing for Power (1993–1998) 
Shortly after the demolition of the Babri mosque and the riots of 1992, the 
BJP lost votes during different state elections.199 Despite the facts that the BJP leadership 
was officially whitewashed and the Indians made the Indian government primarily 
responsible for the deadly results of the Ayodhya incident, the BJP had to “pay the bill” 
for the riots. Even after the success of the Ayodhya campaign, it became clear that a 
strong Hindu nationalistic rhetoric in combination with violent action deterred voters 
from the center. The voter base for such a politic was limited to just a few states of the 
Hindu heartland.200 The vote bank for the BJP identity was still a religious one. 
Chhibber’s data from 1993 show that “Fifty-nine per cent of BJP activists were likely to 
pray, go to temple or attend religious meetings on a more or less regular basis, but only 
20 per cent of the Congress and other party activists were similarly inclined.”201 
This religious party basis, in combination with the influence of RSS and 
VHP agents led to a reassessment about the right course for the BJP between 1992 and 
1998. Especially after elections with minor success for the BJP, debates about the course 
of the BJP came up again.202 “The median point of Indian politics has shifted closer to 
the Sangh ideology, but the old dilemma of whether or not the BJP, to expand, should 
move towards the centre still persists.”203 And this discussion was not just a discussion 
inside the BJP but inside the Hindu nationalistic network as well. Especially, the RSS and 
the VHP with their strong ideological foundation tried to prevent a drift of the BJP 
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towards the centre. The dispute inside the Hindu nationalistic network led to the point 
that, according to Malik, in 1992, “… Professor Rajender Singh, the general secretary of 
the RSS, had declared that all parties, including the Congress (I), were equal for 
them.”204 The reason for this was not only the moderate course of the BJP, but the course 
of the Congress towards support of Hindu issues as well.205 
These discussions did not lead to a fundamental change in party direction, 
but mostly to a change in party rhetoric. The BJP was still a Hindu nationalistic party and 
both the party program as well as the election manifest was still based on the idea of 
Hindutva. Even the position towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir was left 
unchanged. The idea was still to full integration of Kashmir with the Union.206 
The reason for the change in party rhetoric and the slight adaptation of 
party direction was neither a fundamental change of party direction, nor just the party’s 
defeat in some states. According to Hansen, “This change occurred partly because the 
party leaders feared that the Vishva Hindu Parishad would overshadow their organization 
and that they would lose control of the Hindu nationalist political agenda to these more 
extremist forces ….”207 In addition to this, neither the RSS/VHP nor the hardliners of the 
BJP, during the election campaign of 1996, were able to mobilize masses in processions 
as they did in 1992. At least, the moderate wing of the BJP under its leader Vajpayee 
triumphed over the hardliners and set a more moderate course for the BJP. Therefore, the 
BJP was able to build up new alliances with other regional parties.208 
The slight change of party direction contained two aspects. First, a 
rejection of participation in violent actions against Muslims. After 1992, Hindu 
nationalists did not have to support the idea of Mandir209 by organizing more processions 
or violent actions because the idea was already part of the public and according to Yadav, 
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political discourse, and the BJP had already created with the Ayodhya campaign “… 
something of an issue cleavage at the national level.”210 The Ayodhya case was still part 
of the party program, but dealing with Ayodhya showed the shift in party rhetoric. 
Hansen mentioned that “… the party’s double-speak was most apparent in 1997. At a 
BJP-sponsored Muslim youth conference, Advani assured the Muslims that they had 
nothing to fear, but he made a point of mentioning all the issues that had alienated the 
party from the Muslim community, thus emphasizing that the party was not diluting its 
core concerns.”211 
Second, an opening of the party towards a better representation of 
backward castes. According to the ideology of Hindutva and the unity of all Hindus, the 
opening of the party was, according to Shah, a necessity. “Such unity is not possible 
without mobilizing backward castes, Dalits and tribals.”212 But, more important, the 
opening was a means to gain voters from all castes and classes. “The upper-caste 
character of Hindu nationalism has become a greater handicap for the BJP in the 1990s 
because of the growing political consciousness of the low castes in the wake of the 
‘Mandal affair.’ The party could not ignore the OBC’s which account for 52 per cent of 
the population and which were especially mobilized in its strongholds of north India.”213 
Thus, it is not a wonder that one major plank for the BJP campaign of the 1996 elections 
was, according to Kantha, “… to highlight its support for the implementation of Mandal 
Commission recommendations.”214 Facing the known problem of any nationalistic party 
on its way to gaining voters from the right and from the center, the BJP tried to find a 
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way to distinguish itself as an alternative to the Congress without losing its party identity. 
The BJP tried to solve this problem especially by addressing as candidates for the BJP 
those OBC’s who had strong ties to the Hindu nationalistic network and the idea of 
Hindutva. They were fewer agents of their caste / class but of the Hindu nationalist 
ideology. Therefore, the nomination of candidates from lower castes and classes was not 
necessarily an indicator of the opening of the BJP. While the BJP remained mainly a 
party of the upper castes and Hindu nationalists of other castes, it joined coalitions with 
other parties which represented lower castes.215 
The cleavage created by the Ayodhya / Mandir campaign was during this 
phase transported and exploited by the BJP in different ways in the various states. The 
trend of fragmentation led to an increasing importance of the state level for India’s party 
politics. The BJP reacted to this by addressing voters in the Hindu heartland in ways 
other than as potential voters in states outside of the Hindu heartland.216 Due to this fact, 
the BJP could change to a more moderate rhetoric without losing its own profile as a 
distinction to the Congress and without losing its strength in the Hindu heartland. The 
BJP portrayed itself as a modern and progressive party with a strong support for a new 
definition of the Indian nation state, with its specific understanding of secularity and a 
self confident dealing with minorities in Hindu India. The result was a new BJP image of 
self confidence, modernity and progress. Therefore, the BJP was able to obtain voters 
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states outside of the Hindu heartland. “The differentiated trajectories of the BJP in 
different states since the late 1980s have made it abundantly clear that the continuing 
momentum of Hindu nationalism in Indian politics is becoming regionalized.”217 
But, with the success of the BJP on the regional and state level, the BJP 
had to face another set of problems besides the discussion about the right course for a 
Hindu nationalistic party. One major factor for the success of the BJP was the party’s 
discipline and the integrity of the Hindu nationalist workers on the grass roots level. One 
base of this discipline was the homogeneous voter base of the BJP. With opening of the 
BJP to other castes and classes, the voter base lost its unity and diverse interests had to be 
reconciled. Yet, after gaining power in some states, party discipline eroded to a degree 
and some party officials were accused of corruption after obtaining official government 
posts. In addition to this, the BJP had to face the problem that voters remember election 
promises and present the ruling party the bill when these promises are not fulfilled.218 
With its success, the BJP had to take part in the reality of India’s political system. 
However, besides these factors of change of the BJP party image, the long 
lasting effects for the BJP were tremendous. The BJP became established as one of the 
two leading parties of the country. It was not any longer a minor figure in the Indian party 
system, but an opponent of the Congress that had to be taken seriously. Therefore, the 
role of the BJP in future is either the leading party in a coalition to rule India or the 
leading opposition party in the Lok Sabha. The party’s success makes the BJP in the 
                                                 
217 Hansen, The Vernacularisation of Hindutva: The BJP and Shiv Sena in Rural Maharashtra, 177, 
178. See for different BJP’s strategies in Indian states as well Hansen and Jaffrelot, The BJP After the 1996 
Elections, 1-21. Rob Jenkins, “Rajput Hidutva, Caste Politics, Regional Identity and the Hindu Nationalism 
in Contemporary Rajasthan” in The BJP and the Compulsion of Politics in India, eds. Thomas Blom 
Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1998), 101-120. James Manor, 
“Southern Discomfort: The BJP in Karnataka” In The BJP and the Compulsion of Politics in India, eds. 
Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1998), 163-201. 
Gurharpal Singh, “The Akalis and the BJP in Punjab: From Ayodhya to the 1997 Legislative Assembly 
Election” in The BJP and the Compulsion of Politics in India, eds. Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe 
Jaffrelot (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1998), 228-242. Shah, The BJP’s Riddle in Gujarat: Caste, 
Factionalism and Hindutva, 243-266. 
218 Jaffrelot, Setback to BJP, 129-137 and Christophe Jaffrelot, “BJP and the Challenge of 
Factionalism in Madhya Pradesh,” The BJP and the Compulsion of Politics in India, eds. Thomas Blom 
Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1998), 267-290, give an example of 
this BJP-problem for the state of Madhya Pradesh. 
 78
future as attractive as the Congress as an ally for interest groups and minor parties in the 
diverse and heterogeneous party system of India.219 
As a result of its more moderate rhetoric, the BJP gained 120 seats in the 
Lok Sabha election of 1996 and became the strongest party in parliament. According to 
Hansen, “For the first time in 1996, the BJP increased its share of representatives in the 
Lok Sabha through a rather moderate campaign and limited alliances with regional 
parties.”220 Vajpayee received the mandate to form a government. But, after thirteen 
days, he resigned as Prime Minister because he could not find enough support for his 
government. According to Kantha, the main reason for this “… was the lack of credibility 
on the part of the party to live up to its agreement.”221 Due to the fact of the positive 
result of the Lok Sabha election in 1996, the BJP did not change course and rhetoric until 
the Lok Sabha election in 1998. The BJP manifesto for the elections in 1998 was more 
moderate than its statements of the previous elections. “The BJP campaigned on a law 
and order ticket, promising stable and honest government after years of Congress and UF 
misrule.”222 
2. The BJP in Indian Government 1998–2004 
In March 1998, when the BJP won 182 seats in the Lok Sabha election, Vajpayee 
was able to form a government. The BJP in 1998 was still a party that was strongly 
supported by the upper caste, but the party was able to expand its voter base. Between 
1991 and 1998, it shifted gradually away from the upper caste to other communities, 
especially to the Other Backward Castes (OBC’s). Even a higher number of Muslims 
voted for the BJP. Therefore, the social structure of the BJP of 1998 had little in common 
with the BJS of the years before 1980. In addition to this, with aid of allied parties, the 
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BJP was able to expand geographically from the Hindu heartland into other states.223 In 
1998, the BJP ruled in eight states of India. This expansion was possible just with support 
of other allied parties. Therefore, the success of the BJP became dependent on the support 
of allied parties. “If the allies were to let go then in all likelihood the BJP would have a 
long way to fall.”224 
Shortly after gaining power, the BJP led government demonstrated strength 
towards Pakistan and India by testing three nuclear bombs on 11 May 1998 and two 
nuclear bombs two days later. One can argue that this testing was just a reaction to the 
testing of a Pakistani Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads in April 1998,225 but according to Aijaz, it was, as well, an offensive sign to the 
international community, especially towards China and Pakistan, that India was a strong 
military nuclear power. “From the opening of the propaganda offensive by Defense 
Minister Fernandes in early April 1998 to Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton 
after the explosions, the BJP government has maintained its focus on China as the 
strategic adversary that threatens India’s security directly and as the main culprit behind 
Pakistan’s nuclear capability, not to speak of the threat it is said to pose through 
Myanmar.”226 Remarkable for western observers was that the BJP government took 
action of this magnitude by testing the nuclear bombs without any national debate, 
consulting allies or informing neighbors prior to the tests. One can see, with this, the 
same pattern of behavior as in the Ayodhya case. It is marked by announcing a specific 
strong action, using it as a symbol, and carrying it out without any further discussion in 
order to demonstrate hawkishness. Only after this creation of hard facts is the BJP ready 
to discuss the case (of a temple in Ayodhya or of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons).227 To underpin this new strength, the BJP “…has also boosted India’s military 
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presence along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and in the eyes of Pakistan it has made 
threatening noises about the status of Azad [Free] Kashmir.”228 And, additionally, it has 
increased the defense expenditures by 14 per cent and the expenditures for atomic energy 
by 80 per cent in the first BJP budget.229 
In sum, the BJP government demonstrated India’s strength and gave an 
international and domestic signal of the self-confidence of the new Hindu government.230 
But foreign policy issues were not decisive for the course of the BJP, even in the 
case of the relationship towards Pakistan. This signal of strength was necessary for the 
BJP for domestic reasons because the BJP ruled India in a coalition with a minority 
government, which had acted ineptly and needed support from outside of the coalition.231 
The testing of the nuclear bombs brought the BJP this support and consolidated the 
position of the BJP in the short run. Especially after the testing of six Pakistani nuclear 
bombs on 28 and 30 May 1998, the support for the BJP’s decision to test the bomb 
increased in public and in parliament where only “… few MP’s dared to challenge the 
BJP’s decision to carry out the weapon tests.”232 With the testing of the bombs, the BJP 
changed its Hindu nationalism into an Indian nationalism to gain support of all Indians. 
Aijaz argues that “For the BJP to graduate from ‘Hindu’ nationalism to ‘Indian’ 
nationalism, and thus to become a nationally hegemonic power, it too must undergo this 
baptism of fire.”233 However, it followed along the lines of Hindu nationalism, because  
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the decision-making process in the inner circle of BJP and RSS could be judged as a sign 
of militaristic authoritarianism and as a “… move towards implementing the ‘following 
one leader’ principle on a national scale.”234 
The second major topic for the new BJP government was the economy. 
According to Yadav, “The new government quietly and willingly set about the task of 
continuing the economic policies initiated by its Congress predecessors. When the BJP 
finally came to power, it sped up the pace of changes, perhaps somewhat brazenly.”235 
However, the attempts to reform the economy were overall half-hearted. The BJP’s 
ideology and its belief in India’s self-determination, even in economic issues, prevented 
the government from following a long lasting reform course according to the 
recommendations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For the RSS 
and the BJP hardliners, the influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund was nothing more than a kind of neo-colonialism. Economic issues were therefore 
part of the ongoing discussion inside the BJP about the right course for the party. This 
discussion hampered the party’s solving of the economic problems of India. Finally, 
intrigues within the coalition were decisive for the breakdown of the coalition in 1999. 
Despite these domestic problems during the first years of ruling India, the BJP became 
stronger in the 1999 elections and gained power again. The BJP gained 182 seats and 
formed a coalition with some other parties in 1999, called the National Democratic 
Alliance. Together they held 300 seats in the Lok Sabah. 
Yet, domestic issues were not decisive for the success of the BJP in the 1999 
election. It was the Kargil War and the positive result for India that were crucial for the 
BJP. The Kargil War demonstrated, in the eyes of the voters, that the BJP was a 
guarantor to ensure India’s security. The Kargil War demonstrated also that the BJP 
government acted responsibly towards Pakistan. Although the Indian government reacted 
to a Muslim intrusion into an area of Kashmir (district of Kargil) with massive use of 
regular Indian land and air forces, the government limited the intervention to the Indian 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. Despite the obvious fact that the intruders were Pakistani, 
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the BJP government did not use the incident to expand the military mission between India 
and Pakistan. Instead of this, the BJP government acted responsibly, stopped the advance 
of the Indian troops at the Line of Control (LOC) and prevented an escalation of the 
conflict into a war between India and Pakistan. Even more, the Indian government did not 
cut off the Lahore Bus Service between India and Pakistan opened just before the Kargil 
War, and still tried to normalize the connection to Pakistan. In sum, the BJP was able to 
use the Kargil War to increase its foreign reputation 
After the Kargil War, India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan was almost 
consistent with the foreign policy of the former Indian governments, yet stronger in 
execution of measures. The BJP government increased its defense expenditures and its 
behavior towards Pakistan was characterized by a mixture of self-confident strength and 
responsible pragmatism. The strong, but not over-escalating foreign policy was seen, for 
example, in the cases of the Atlantique incident236 in 1999 and in the attack on the Indian 
parliament in 2001. 237 However, despite tensions between India and Pakistan, the United 
States of America in September 2001 removed sanctions against India (and Pakistan) 
which were imposed after the nuclear tests in 1998. But this measure was not a sign of 
recognition of India’s foreign policy. Rather, it was a reaction to the incident of 
September 11, 2001 and a means to improve the American footprint in South Asia for the 
fight against terrorism. Tensions between India and Pakistan were still intense. 
Especially, infiltrations and suicide attacks in the Kashmir region meant a security threat 
for India’s government. As a consequence, the numbers of troops in the Kashmir region 
were at a peak, and according to Saez, by end of May “… Indian government officials 
openly discussed the possibility of crossing the LOC and launching air strikes against 
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suspected terrorist camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir.”238 Only U.S. intervention could 
impel India to reduce the number of troops in Kashmir.239 However, in 2003, the BJP 
government changed course and offered Pakistan the establishment of diplomatic 
relations and took some steps to defuse the Kashmir problem (“composite dialogue”). 
Yet, the reason for this change was less a shift of its principal policy regarding the Indian 
position towards Kashmir or Pakistan than a mixture of pressure from the outside (United 
States) and from the inside. India’s strategy of a “coercive diplomacy,” the imposing of 
political changes by military threat, had proved unsuccessful. India’s elite, especially the 
business class, criticized the BJP government for its costly mobilizing of the army on the 
Pakistani border for ten months during the years 2001 and 2002 without gaining any 
major concessions from Pakistan. 
The fight against terrorism was also a major domestic topic for the BJP 
government. The government enacted a new law of Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 
(POTO) which was controversial “… because it allowed the executive to intercept 
various communications protocols.”240 The BJP tried to demonstrate strength both on the 
international level and on the domestic level. At the same time, the BJP tried to present 
itself as a party for all Indians. The nomination of A. J. P. Abdul Kalam, a Muslim and 
architect of India’s nuclear program, for president was one example of this dual strategy. 
Nevertheless, the domestic situation of the BJP was still marked by discussions about the 
right course for the party and contradictions inside the ruling coalition. The reshuffling of 
the cabinet was one obvious indicator of this discussion. 
The overall center-oriented politics of the BJP on the national level could not hide 
the fact that the BJP still pursued a Hindu nationalistic agenda. Over the whole period 
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hardliners in the BJP and the Hindu nationalistic network used any weakness of the 
moderate wing of the BJP to put some classical Hindutva themes back at the top of the 
party’s agenda. 
These Hindutva orientated politics became obvious in domestic policies, namely 
in the BJP ruled states like Gujarat. In 2002, when Gujarat was ruled by Chief Minister 
Narendra Modi, riots between Hindus and Muslims broke out and led to the death of 
several hundred people, mostly Muslims. The BJP ruled government did not intervene to 
prevent the violence and the Chief Minister was accused of being involved in the 
planning of the riots.241 Another example happened in 2005 in Gujarat when it became 
public that in schoolbooks the ideology of National Socialism and the idea of one 
dominant race were glorified. Not only in Gujarat had the BJP tried to manipulate the 
writing of history in the sense of Savarkar’s Hindutva. In contrast to the crude Hindu 
nationalistic rhetoric of the mid 1980s, the BJP’s course of action was in this phase more 
indirect and hidden. And, as a consequence of the change in India’s political system, 
Hindu nationalistic politics was shifted from the center to the state level. But, by end of 
2002, the BJP ruled only in four Indian states. 
After four years of ruling India, the BJP led coalition of 22 parties (named the 
National Democratic Alliance – NDA) opted for fresh elections in 2004. The reasons 
were domestic issues and the conviction of the BJP leadership that they would win the 
elections. But, the opposite happened. The BJP, and especially its allies, underperformed 
and lost power. The BJP won 138 of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha. Different reasons led to 
this development. First, the Congress was able to stop its decline, consolidate its power, 
exploit the public perception that economic liberalization under the BJP was seen as 
benefitting a relatively narrow segment of the Indian population, and performed better 
with its allies than in 1999. Second, the BJP lost some support of the higher castes. 
Third, due to the fact of the increasing fragmentation of India’s party system, the success 
of the two major parties (BJP and Congress) became highly dependent on the success of 
their allies on the state levels. The success of minor parties at the state level was 
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dependent on short-term issues caused by these parties.242 Besides the inner party 
discussion about the course of the BJP, therefore, the leadership of the BJP had to face 
the additional problem of coordinating its policy with allies who differed in ideology, 
orientation and perspective. To be successful in ruling India, the BJP had to develop a 
policy of adjustment and compromise. But this policy had the disadvantages that the BJP 
lost a part of its reputation as a strong party with a strong leadership. In addition to this, 
the BJP government failed to improve the welfare of the Indian population and therefore 
lost some of its spirit as well.243 
Another factor of Indian society especially hampered the BJP in gaining more 
votes. Dasgupta points out that the Hindu nationalistic voter base was not as stable as it 
seemed from the outside. “Hindu or non-Hindu identity is unnecessary and irrelevant for 
the political community to cohere or prosper. Citizens can draw on repertoires of identity 
available to them. Allegiance is a political creation.”244 So, the BJP could no longer trust 
in a certain voter base but had to compete even with small new parties on the state level 
for voters with affection for the BJP ideology. 
3. The BJP as Opposition Party 2004–2008 
After the BJP’s defeat in the Lok Sabah elections of 2004, the BJP did not change 
course significantly. The party strategy of the years 1998–2004 was, in principle, 
successful and established the BJP as one of the two major parties on a national level in 
India. 
The party strategy can be described as dual because it pursues two different 
courses. The primary course of the BJP is to present the BJP as a responsible centrist 
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alternative to the Congress, especially on the national level. The secondary course, on the 
state level, depends on the voter base in the individual states. In states of the Hindu 
heartland, the BJP can still act as a strong Hindu nationalistic party. Yet, in other states, 
as well as on the national level, the BJP has to adapt to a more moderate course. With this 
dual strategy, the BJP has been, until now, very successful. In 2007, it won in the states 
of Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh, and with its surprising victory in the state of Karnataka 
in May 2008 (BJP won 110 of 224 seats), the BJP was for the first time able to form a 
state government in the south of India.245 And, interestingly enough, the BJP was able to 
win 16 of 21 seats in Bangalore city, India’s most important and highly developed IT 
centre. However, according to Thakurta, “… the manner in which the party responded to 
the defeat in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections shows quite clearly that the tendency to keep 
returning to the Hindutva plank whenever the BJP sees itself as facing a crisis is far from 
being a thing of the past.”246 
And, once again, the BJP gained advantages from the weakness of the Congress 
which was not able to solve the economic problems of India. “Although the BJP is still 
far from a unified force, it is likely to profit both from the worsening economic 
conditions that seem certain to mar the final months of the UPA government’s term and 
from anti-incumbency sentiment that characterises Indian voting patterns.”247  
For the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP has chosen the fight against terrorism 
as the key for its election campaign and chosen the slogan “Save India.” With this focus 
on national security, the BJP presents itself once again as a party of law and order and 
Hindu Indian strength. And, once again, it puts its hopes in gaining voters from the urban 
middle class. 
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4. Summary 
The BJP’s politics, during the time frame of 1980 to 2008, were characterized by 
a remarkable sense of pragmatism and adaptability. The general challenge for the BJP 
was to maintain its Hindu nationalistic identity yet gain power by attracting non-Hindu 
nationalistic voters. The experiences of the years of the Ayodhya campaign showed that a 
crude Hindu nationalistic rhetoric strengthens the Hindu nationalistic party identity and 
ensures the votes of the staunch supporters, but frightens off the majority. On the other 
hand, the debacle of 1984 showed that the BJP needs a clear profile to distinguish itself 
from the Congress. With its manifesto for the election of 1998, the BJP found the 
appropriate course of action out of this dilemma. 
Without losing its identity as a Hindu nationalist party, the BJP represented itself 
as moderate and as an alternative to the Congress. They were able to do this by covering 
up the means for spreading Hindu nationalistic topics, renouncing the use of crude Hindu 
nationalistic rhetoric and appealing to the Indian nationalistic feelings of the people. With 
this, they created a kind of Janus-headed Hindu nationalistic party. In public, Hindu 
nationalism is used only selectively by the BJP as a means to ensure support from its own 
voter base. Represented as Indian nationalism, the BJP used Hindu nationalistic ideas to 
distinguish the BJP from the Congress. But the ties to the RSS still exist and, as the 
example of Gujarat shows, subliminally the BJP is still trying to change the society of 
India in the sense of a Hindu nationalism and Hindutva. 
Yet, the flexibility of the BJP shows that even the Hindutva ideology could be 
interpreted as flexible by Hindu nationalists. Despite its roots, the BJP after 1998 is 
depicted not as the rigid force explained by Golwalkar and others in the RSS. After 1998, 
it had a modern face, attractive for nearly all citizens of India. Therefore, the BJP 
developed into a powerful opposition to the Congress. Still, in 1989, Chhibber and 
Petrocik argued that no “… comparable national opposition can emerge because there is 
no national position for any party to oppose, and no regional opponent enjoys a national 
resource comparable to Congress’s history as the party which brought independence.”248 
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And they used the BJP as an example of a nationwide operating party competitive only 
within regional boundaries. They called the BJP a “Hindi-heartland party”249 But the rise 
of the BJP has disproved this argument. The BJP was able to rise and to establish itself as 
an opposition force not for historical merits but because it creates a new Hindu-Indian 
history which starts in ancient times and not in the year 1947. And, it was able to expand 
its voter base to areas other then the Hindu heartland. In addition to this, the BJP has, in 
comparison to the Congress, the advantage of having a loyal voter base of Hindu 
nationalists. In contrast to the BJP, the Congress and its allies never developed a common 
doctrine or ideology on the basis of Indian secularism. According to Seal, “Those who 
have convinced themselves that India is the home of spiritual values have found them 
everywhere in her politics; others have seen nothing but homo homini lupus.”250 
But the result of the 2004 election showed the limits of the BJP politics within the 
changing party system of India. The trend towards a state orientated policy and the 
pressure to build coalitions hampered the BJP from succeeding with a pure Hindu 
nationalistic policy on the national level. It shattered the myth of a strong Hindu 
nationalistic leadership and made the BJP more vulnerable than the Congress. 
Additionally, it showed that the Hindutva ideology neither replaced the idea of a Western 
style secular Indian nation nor remained anchored in the whole of Indian society. 
Dasgupta argues, “A disaggregated analysis will reveal the danger of drawing inference 
regarding coherence or solidarity associated with any major religious community. 
Relative schism, solidarity, inclusion, exclusion, and other processes within these 
communities change over time in ways that census mechanisms in India can rarely 
respond to.”251  
However, the discontinuities in BJP politics have not been caused by a general 
shift in BJP’s party politics. Despite discussions within the BJP and between the BJP 
leadership and the RSS/VHP about the right course for the BJP, the general ideological 
foundation and the ties to the Hindu nationalistic network are still, today, untouched. 
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Moreover, the strong ties between the BJP and the Sangh Parivar prevents the BJP from 
developing towards a centrist party.252 And, any judgment about BJP politics has to 
differentiate between BJP rhetoric (and its change over time) and practical BJP politics 
(on the national level and on the state level). Or, as Hansen argues, “Political parties do 
not change their identity without changing their core commitments. In this context it is 
important to distinguish between tactical shifts and strategic ideological 
transformation.”253 Until today, the BJP has shifted tactics in order to gain or hold power 
but has not changed its ideology and strategy. 
Decisive reasons for the moderate BJP rhetoric on the national level when gaining 
power were the increasing fragmentation of Indian politics, the increasing self-confidence 
of the marginalized groups of society and the compulsion to build coalitions. 
The BJP’s politics is influenced by allies in the coalition and is dependent on 
coalition partners. But the discontinuities of BJP’s party politics and the moderate 
influence of the Hindutva ideology on the national level and on India’s foreign policy 
were not caused just by the necessity of coalition building. They are, as well, a 
consequence of the special characteristics of the Indian political system. According to 
van Dyke, “Parties which are opposed to each other on the state level may form coalitions 
together at the Center, while Indian states themselves demonstrate a great diversity in the 
configuration of their political party system.…”254 This general trend affected the BJP 
also. The BJP formed state and national level coalitions with different partners who were 
distinguished widely by ideology and party politics.  
Two general explanations are possible for this paradox of coalition building 
despite ideological differences. First, ideology and ideological differences do not play as 
important a role for parties in India as they play in Western democracies. If this 
explanation is true, one can assume that gaining power (and patronage) is the primary 
goal of Indian parties and politicians even when this will lead to denying a party’s 
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convictions. On the one hand, this could be assessed as a sign of a decline in the morality 
of politicians. On the other hand, one can argue that the Hindu nationalistic ideology is 
nothing other than a means to gain voters, but is not to be taken seriously as a practical 
matter for politics. Second, the BJP ideology is meanwhile widespread in India and a 
common ideology and marks no decisive difference between the different parties which 
could make cooperation impossible. If this explanation is true, the Hindu nationalists 
were at least partly successful in changing Indian society towards a Hindu nationalistic 
attitude. And, one has to be doubtful about the way of Indian democracy and secularism 
in the future. 
Besides the trend to form coalitions, another development of the Indian political 
system influenced the course of the BJP’s politics. The development towards more 
federalism led to the fact that factionalism became common all over India. It is not 
surprising that the BJP’s ideology of Hindutva could not play the decisive role in national 
domestic and international politics, even under a BJP led government. The coordination 
with the higher number of small state level based parties inside of a coalition, and the 
different agreements between the BJP and regional parties on the state level, led to the 
consequence that state level topics became dominant over a theoretical Hindu 
nationalistic ideology. On a single state level, especially in states of the Hindu heartland, 
a situation may totally differ from the national level because of the possible predominant 
influence of politics oriented on ethnic lines. However, this is a question for another 
examination. 
B. THE AYODHYA CASE AS A DOMESTIC ISSUE OF HINDU 
NATIONALISM 
1. Muslims and Hindus in India 
On December 6, 1992, a group of approximately 150,000 Hindu Nationalists 
destroyed the Babri mosque in Ayodhya. In the aftermath of the demolition of the Babri 
mosque, riots between Muslims and Hindus occured all over India. As a result, more then 
2,000 people were killed. The riots resulting from the events in Ayodhya were the 
beginning of a phase of increasing tensions between Hindus and Muslims in India. With 
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regard to the violence in the aftermath of the partition of India and Pakistan, one may 
argue that tension between Hindus and Muslims is part of Indian history. But different 
examinations show that violence between Hindus and Muslims existed after 1950 on an 
acceptable level for a multiethnic society,255 but increased again in the 1980s when 
Hindu nationalism rose. Jaffrelot underpins the importance of this development by 
arguing, “This phenomenon is a challenging one for social scientists in so far as the 
essential characteristics of Hinduism scarcely lend themselves to a closed and monolithic 
radicalism of the type associated with Muslim, Jewish or Christian ‘fundamentalism.’”256 
With about 13.4% of India’s population, Muslims are a minority. The Muslim 
population is spread over India. There are only a few settlement areas with a Muslim 
concentration (as the the state of Jammu and Kashmir). Yet with a number of about 138 
million, India comprises the second largest Muslim population in the world (after 
Indonesia). Muslims belong mostly to India’s lower classes. They have a high poverty 
rate (especially in urban areas), their literacy rate is below the national average, and their 
representation in the government is about four percent lower than their share of the 
population.257 
Despite their large numbers, it is difficult to talk about the Muslims as a single, 
unified player with one interest in India or in the Ayodhya conflict. In contrast to the 
organization of the Hindu nationalists, the Muslims in India were loosely organized and 
focused on local issues. Different Muslim organizations work independently and are not 
able to form a common opinion of Muslims in India. Especially differences between 
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orthodox and modern Muslims prevent the development of strong and united 
organizations. Orthodox Muslims try to expand special rights for Muslims whereas 
modern Muslims put more emphasis on the secularism of the Indian state and the 
integration of Muslims into the state. Even in the political realm, Muslims are unable to 
create a Muslim party on the national level. Historically, India’s Muslims mainly tried to 
influence the politics of the Congress in order to gain advantages. Only one Muslim party 
operated in some states of India. 
Muslims in India did not differ from the Hindus just because of religion. 
According to Talbot, “The Muslim warriors of Turkic origin who invaded and settled in 
peninsular India were certainly a separate ethnic group, comprising their own social unit 
and possessing their own culture. But their “Otherness” included many distinct features 
beyond simply religion – language, costume, marriage customs and fighting styles, to 
name a few.”258 But, despite these distinct features, Hindus and Muslims had developed a 
high number of concurrent social practices and beliefs since the fourteenth century.259 
“Contemporary historians of India do not even agree on whether or not here existed 
before the nineteenth century anything that could be called Hindu or Muslim communal 
identities, and, a fortiori, on whether or not Hindu-Muslim conflict was endemic.”260 
And, it is doubtful as well whether a Muslim identity existed in India in the mid 1980’s. 
With this, Muslims in India did not primarily feel Muslim, but Indian with some 
distinctions in comparison to the Hindu majority. 
In the mid 1980s, these distinctions became more important with the decline of 
the Congress, which lost its ability to be the unifying power for all groups of society. This 
marked the end of the one-party dominance in India and opened the gate for individual 
groups to increase the pressure on political parties in order to gain influence and 
patronage as a service in return for votes. Therefore, the pressure some Muslim  
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organizations put on the government in order to increase minority rights for the Muslims 
was not a sign of Islamization, but a reaction to a change in the political system of India 
and the concomitant sense of an increasing threat to Muslims in India.261 
This explains why tensions on this scale between Muslims and Hindus had not 
broken out earlier and were limited to some parts of India.262 Muslims and Hindus were 
not enemies, per se, but they became opponents due to the new definition of Hinduism. 
The definition of Muslims as “the Other” became the new unifying source for Hindu 
India. According to Vanaik, “Hindus can now hopefully be united not by what they are 
supposed to share but what they oppose, even to the point of hostility.”263 In addition to 
this, for the Hindu nationalists, the new definition of Hinduism was a means to reaffirm 
the nation’s cultural identity. Thus, it is clear that a primordial argument about an eternal 
hostility between Muslims and Hindus is not useful as an explanation for tensions 
between Hindus and Muslims. Instead, political entrepreneurs constructed hostilities by 
appealing to and widening existing fault lines of society. The definition of the Muslims as 
“the Other” was just a means used by Hindu nationalists to support the social construct of 
a new kind of Hinduism. 
2. The Historical Background of the Ayodhya Case 
The Babri mosque was built, probably in the sixteenth century, by order of the 
first Mughal emperor of India, Babur.264 The Hindus believe that the Babri mosque was 
built on the ruins of a Hindu temple which had been destroyed by a Muslim commander 
in chief. Many Hindus believe that the temple was built to commemorate the birthplace 
of Rama the king of Ayodhya265 and avatar (reincarnation) of the Hindu god Vishnu. 
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Vishnu is in the trimurti (“Hindiu triad” or “great trinity”) of Hinduism, the preserver, 
while Brahma is the creator and Shiva is the destroyer. 
Ayodhya is one of the seven holy towns of India, lies in the Indian State of Uttar 
Pradesh, has a population of 80,000 and many mosques and Hindu temples. The Babri 
mosque was the largest mosque in Ayodhya. In the past, it had been used as a house of 
worship by Muslims and by Hindus as well. Between 1853 and 1855, the first riots 
between Muslims and Hindus were noted when Hindus wanted to occupy the mosque and 
its terrain. After this, the British colonial administration mediated a compromise between 
Hindus and Muslims. Hindus were prohibited from accessing the inner area of the 
mosque, but they were allowed to worship in its courtyard. In 1883, the British colonial 
administration dismissed a request by some Hindus who wanted to build a Hindu temple 
on the mosque’s terrain. 
In 1934, Hindu riots led to damage of one of the domes of the mosque. In 1949, 
someone placed idols of Rama and Sita (the wife of Rama) inside the mosque. As a 
result, the police administration gave the order to remove the idols. Instead of this, the 
council of the district of Fayzabad asked the Imam to leave the mosque, and closed it. 
Only Hindu priests and a limited number of Hindu believers were allowed access to the 
mosque. In the aftermath of this, Muslims took legal action in order to overturn this 
decision. Hindus also tried to change the situation by taking legal action as well, but the 
courts decided to keep the situation unchanged.266 
3. The Ayodhya Campaign Since the 1980s 
In 1984, the Hindu nationalists, namely the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) started their 
Ayodhya campaign. They were looking for a new symbol for their political campaigns 
and found it in the person of Ram. Even when nobody could prove the truth of the story, 
the legend of Ram and the story of the temple of Ram in Ayodhya were very popular and 
widespread in India. For the Hindu nationalists, both the fight against the use of the Babri 
mosque as a mosque, and for construction of a Hindu temple at the birthplace of Ram, 
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was a logical continuation of a centuries old fight of Hindus against Muslims. Because of 
this, Ram was the ideal figure for Hindu identification. The religious diversity of 
Hinduism was reduced by making Ram a symbol of Hinduism and national unity.267 Yet, 
this Hinduism was different from the peaceful Hinduism offered by Mahatma Gandhi and 
Nehru. According to Corbridge, it was the kind of Hinduism which Savarkar had 
propagated, “… a Hinduism which could defend the timeless glories of Indian 
civilizations.”268 And, in addition, by defining the Muslims as the “Others,” identification 
of Hinduism had another cornerstone. First, the campaign was one of processions and 
pilgrim parties, but in 1986, a district judge decided to open the gates of the mosque in 
order to allow Hindus to worship there. This decision led to reactions by Muslim 
organizations, which started to organize peaceful marches to Ayodhya. But, the Muslim 
planning did not lead to coordinated actions because the Muslims were more focused on 
the case of Shah Bano, its discussion in public, and the consequences for Muslims in 
India. 
However, the VHP used the opportunity to use this Muslim lack of coordinated 
action as a signal for expanding the VHP campaign. The VHP emphasized the 
importance for all Hindus of the birthplace of Ram on this holy ground and expanded the 
campaign to get more support. And, they declared that marches of Muslims to Ayodhya 
were to be judged as an attack on Hindu society which would lead to counter measures. 
The leader of the BJP, Lal Krishan Advani, argued in 1989 that the Ayodhya issue was 
not simply a dispute, but a symbol of pseudo secularism and appeasement of the 
minorities.269 
Although local Muslim and Hindu leaders declared that they could find a peaceful 
agreement for the use of the area of the Babri mosque, the VHP provoked a confrontation 
and spread the dispute all over India. The VHP planned to lay the foundation for a new 
Hindu temple on the site of the Babri mosque in September / October of 1989. This date 
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was planned purposely because elections for the Indian parliament (Lok Saba) were also 
scheduled for the end of 1989. By choosing this date, the VHP carried the dispute into the 
political arena and put the Indian government under pressure. The VHP thought that it 
was now a matter for the government to avoid any clash on the site of the Babri mosque 
by taking a position pro Hinduism. By doing so, the Indian government, and hereby the 
Indian National Congress (Congress), could prove their efforts in doing something for the 
Hindu majority, and thus for the majority of the voters of India.270 
The government of India finally permitted laying the foundation for a Hindu 
temple about sixty meters from the Babri mosque, but still on the disputed site of the 
mosque. The VHP promised that no further action would be taken. With this agreement 
on November 09, 1989, the foundation for a Hindu temple was laid on the site of the 
Babri mosque. The soft attitude of the Indian government led to further development of 
the Ayodhya campaign as a cornerstone of the Hindu nationalist movement. In October 
1990, the situation escalated again when the VHP announced the beginning of the 
temple’s construction. Prime Minister V.P. Singh made a speech on television and 
explained that the VHP and BJP rejected his wish for a court decision about the Ayodhya 
case. The BJP Minister Advani was arrested because of his participation in the Ayodhya 
campaign. As a result, the BJP withdrew its support for the Janata party ruled 
government. 
Between October 30, 1990, and November 1, 1990, approximately 10,000–40,000 
Hindu nationalists tried to reach the site of the Babri mosque. Officially, they wanted to 
begin the construction of the Ram temple. Probably, they wanted to destroy the mosque 
in order to build the Ram temple on the former site of the mosque. In a first rush, the 
Hindu nationalists were able to destroy one dome of the mosque. But, on the following 
day, the security forces which protected the mosque were able to set the Hindu 
nationalists back by using armed fire. Because of the ten to one hundred deaths during  
these incidents, the Hindu nationalists decided to break off the attacks on the mosque. 
The events on October 30, 1990 and November 01, 1990 were the prelude for the 
demolition of the Babri mosque on December 06, 1992. 
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4. Explanations 
The Ayodhya campaign was part of a process to define Hinduism in a new way 
and to transform it. Ram and the dispute with the Muslims in Ayodhya were in this sense 
only symbols for the awakening of a new Hinduism. The Ayodhya movement was part of 
the Hindu nationalist’s campaign to reaffirm the nation’s cultural identity and a signal to 
other political parties to end, in the sense of the BJP, their pseudo secular politics which 
favored minorities for the sake of a Western style secularism. Yet, BJP officials argued 
that the Ayodhya campaign was not an anti-Muslim campaign because Hindu nationalists 
were not per se anti Muslim.271 The argument offered by Van der Veer after the 
beginning of the Ayodhya campaign in 1985 is highly applicable. Religious feelings and 
values do matter, but “… they cannot be divorced from the political processes in which 
they are produced and managed.”272 
The political processes were the struggle between the Congress and the BJP to 
gain Hindu votes. Malik argues, “By pitting Ram against Babur, the BJP changed the 
context of Indian politics. For the majority of Hindus Ram represents the tradition 
(maryada) of Hindu culture; now he became a national symbol. Babur, on the other hand, 
was an invader and conqueror who expressed dislike for both the people and the country 
which he had conquered.”273 This shows not just the political dimension of the Ayodhya 
case, but the underpinnings of the emotional importance for India’s Hindus as well. 
Additionally, the explanations of the Hindu nationalists show the power of 
symbols and the way Hindu nationalists combine religion with politics. Religious 
symbols, for example in the processions of Hindu nationalists, had a tremendous 
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religion, it was not easy for the authorities of the state to intervene because this could 
have been judged as being against the religion of the Hindus. In addition to this, the 
processions had another effect on the connection between Hindus and Muslims. Even in 
areas were Hindus and Muslims lived normally together in peace and harmony, 
processions created tensions, and in some cases were the reason for riots between Hindus 
and Muslims.274 So, even when the original aim of the processions could not be reached, 
they led to another result which was in the interest of the VHP, Hindus seeing Muslims as 
“different” citizens. 
In combination with the rhetoric of Hindu nationalists, the processions addressed 
different groups of Hindus due to political and religious reasons and formed a desire for 
solidarity among the Hindus.275 Yet, the Hindu nationalists did not just use traditional 
religious symbols and religious means like processions. They used modern media, such 
as videos, as an instrument for political transformation of religious symbols and for 
manipulation of the people as well.276 With this combination of religious symbols and 
modern media as a means to connect the realm of religion with the realm of politics, one 
aim of the Hindu nationalists became clear. This was the superseding of the secular 
Indian state by a non-secular Hindu state. 
In addition to the religious reasons for the rise of Hinduism, the VHP was able to 
push this process of transformation and to use the symbol of Ram because since the case 
of Shah Bano the Muslims had been fragmented into two factions. One was the faction of 
modern Muslims. The other faction supported traditional Islam under the rule of Sharia. 
In contrast to the weak and loosely organized religious community of the Muslims, the 
Hindu nationalist ideology and its network consisting of Hindu nationalist organizations 
and a Hindu nationalist party had existed since India’s independence. According to 
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Crawford, the VHP was able to transform “… cultural identity into political 
identity … .”277 Without having a strong and united opponent, the division of the 
Muslims made it easier for the VHP to pursue its goals. 
The above-mentioned reasons were not, however, the decisive ones for the 
successful mobilization of the masses and the outbreak of riots beginning in the late 
1980s. The decisive factor was the weakness of the state in combination with a weak 
ruling party. Indian nationalism was key for the founding and developing of a modern 
Indian state. But, Indian nationalism was a construct based on the ideas of the leadership 
of the Congress in order to overcome the difficulties and complexities of the multi-ethnic, 
multi-linguistic, multi-caste and multi-religious society of India.278 And this concept of a 
secular nationalism competed, from the beginning, with another concept of religious 
Indian nationalism, the Hindu nationalism.279 The further development and existence of 
democracy and peace within India was dependent on India’s leadership and its ability to 
bring all groups together, to balance interests and demands and to find acceptable 
compromises. Snyder shows the importance of elites for the development path of 
democratizing, but his theoretical explanations end when a country reaches one of four 
types of nationalism.280 The case of India shows that the process does not end with 
establishing one type of nationalism. In India, the Ayodhya case shows that civic 
nationalism may be change to ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism can change when 
elites lose their ability to persuade people of their ideas. Any nationalism, created by 
elites as a unifying idea to establish democracy, needs an unchallenged and 
acknowledged leadership to survive during times of crisis in the marketplace of ideas.281 
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In India, one could argue, it was the elite who lost the ability to protect civic 
nationalism. And indeed, this would have been true if one could identify such an elite. 
During the first thirty years of India’s history (after independence), the elite could be 
identified within the Congress. The Congress was equal to the state, ran the country and 
was the stabilizing factor during the first thirty years of the country. But, the Congress 
weakened from the first voting out of Indira Gandhi and never regained its old unlimited 
strength.282 After 1977, it became clear that the Congress could not any longer be the sole 
guarantor of a peaceful India. This task has to become a task of the government and 
hereby of the state institutions. 
The Janata party, the successor of the Congress as the ruling party, was not a 
cohesive party coalition primarily founded in order to beat the Congress. The Congress, 
which came to power again between 1980 and 1989, was hampered by economic 
problems, the state government ruled by the BJP, and a bribe affair. Additionally, the 
Congress acted weakly and unfortunately in religious matters when in power to rule 
India.283 According to Banerjee, there was “… a marked contrast between the Indian 
state’s intolerance and suppression of ideas and activities (mainly pursued by minorities – 
ethnic or religious) that are suspected to be ‘secessionist’ on the one hand, and its 
permissive – almost deferential – treatment of propaganda and acts carried out openly by 
self-proclaimed revivalists of the majority community, which incite violence on religious 
issues.”284 However, sixty per cent of the Hindu supporters of the destruction of the 
Babri mosque felt that the Congress-ruled government showed preference for some 
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groups (Muslims) over others (Hindus).285 This result, shown in a survey, may be 
interpreted in two ways. First, it can be interpreted as evidence for the preference of the 
government for the Muslims, and therefore as a sign for state weakness, because the 
government was not able to ensure a neutral position towards religion. Second, it could 
be interpreted as an indicator for the success of the campaign of the Hindu nationalist 
network to make the Hindus feel threatened by a government which supported minorities. 
One additional indicator for the weakness of the state is given by a survey of 
Chhibber, Misra and Sisson. In 1991, after the election, they asked voters to identify the 
two most important problems confronting the locality, the state and the nation. As the 
major recent problem on all three levels, they identified the problem of order / 
community (47% of the voters on the national level, 50% on the state level and 32% on 
the local level), and problems of economics ranked on the national level and on the state 
level in second place (30% on national level, 26% on the state level).286 Maintaining 
order and ensuring the security of its citizens is one of the main tasks for any 
government. The results of the survey show that even in the eyes of Indian voters, the 
state was weak. 
But the detailed evaluation of the data shows that in the state of Uttar Pradesh 
(where Ayodhya is located), economic/infrastructural problems ranked in place one 
(45%) and the problem of order and community ranked in place two (45%). Additionally, 
consensus among religions in Uttar Pradesh was relatively weak with just 64%.287 This 
result could lead to the conclusion that economic reasons were one driving factor for 
religious tensions and the eruption of riots in Ayodhya. But such an argument is too 
superficial because economic problems in other states also ranked in place one but did 
not lead to a lack of consensus among religions or riots between religious groups. The  
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reason for this is that economic problems are not the decisive independent variable for 
religious tensions. Economic problems, only in combination with a problem of order, 
lead to tensions among religions.288 
Economic problems hampered the Janata Dal government which ruled India from 
1989 until 1991, as well, and reached their height during the Congress rule between 1991 
and 1996. And, in combination with the force to liberalize the domestic market, they 
changed the circumstances for the traditional “social contract”289 of society. But social 
contract in this case meant that the state had for many years protected its own industries 
by opting for an import-substituting industrialization (ISI) after independence. The reason 
for this was that Indian business dominated the government. According to Chhibber, 
“Indian capitalists in the years immediately after Independence refused to countenance a 
state with wide-ranging regulatory and interventionist powers, and organized effectively 
against it.”290 For Indian industry, it was not necessary to become competitive because 
the ISI protected Indian industry from foreign imports. But, with the economic crisis of 
the late 1980s, a change in Indian policy became necessary. In the eyes of the classes 
with lower economic status, concerns about economic problems were high291 but 
globalization became more a threat for the ruling elite. Thus, economic reasons were not 
necessarily decisive for the increasing tensions between Hindus and Muslims. They were, 
however, one reason for the increasing support of the BJP by capitalists and landowners. 
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Economic / infrastructural 31 44 47 62 48 33 
Order and community 64 36 17 24 45 63 
Consensus among religions 83 53 90 86 64 89 
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These property-owning classes felt threatened by free markets and were attracted by the 
BJP’s rhetoric of national self-reliance because measures for self-reliance would 
strengthen their market position.292  
Additionally, as shown in this thesis, economic problems and globalization led to 
reforms in India, which weakened the power of the center and strengthened the power of 
the states. Together with the rising self-consciousness of marginalized groups, this led to 
fragmentation of India’s political system and to the development of new parties which 
had their strongholds in different states. 
Altogether, this political context prepared the stage for the success of Hindu 
nationalists between the Ayodhya campaign in 1992 and the BJP’s success in 1996 when 
the BJP seized power. As Jaffrelot argues, the political context and the weakness of the 
state were the opportunity for the Hindu nationalist network to mobilize the masses and 
show the power of Hindu nationalism.293 Between 1980 and 1992, one can find factors in 
India, identified by Tarrow as key dimensions for evoking a mass movement: “… (1) the 
opening of access to participation for new actors; (2) the evidence of political 
realignment within the policy; (3) the appearance of influential allies; (4) emerging splits 
within the elite; and (5) a decline in the state’s capacity or will to repress the dissent.”294 
With this came the opportunity during this time period allowing the rise of Hindu 
nationalism. 
What was decisive for the increase of violence in Ayodhya was the combination 
of two sets of elements. 
First, representatives of the Hindu nationalistic network were able to mobilize the 
masses by provoking the Hindu majority’s fear of the Muslim minority. They presented 
the people with a mix of historical memories, myths and emotions which built up the 
framework for the polarization of society. In addition, they were able to gain the support 
of capitalists and landowners. Finally, actions of one side in the conflict provoked 
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counteractions by the other side. “Together, these inter-group and intra-group interactions 
combine …  to create a vicious cycle that threatens to pull multi-ethnic societies into 
violence.”295 And the only power which could theoretically break through this vicious 
cycle was the state. 
Second, the Indian state and its institutions were weak and often used the same 
symbols296 and codes of behavior which were being used by the Hindu nationalists to 
mobilize the masses. And there “… has never been any dispute between the state and the 
Hindu communal leaders over the sacrosanctity of these components of Hindu symbolism 
and behavioural pattern.” With this, the state became unable to arbitrate between 
Muslims and Hindus and powerless to react vigorously in any case of provocation and 
violence. According to Basu, the accommodating Indian state radicalized, with its 
actions, the demands of religious nationalists. “Hindu nationalists are likely to gain a 
sympathetic hearing from the state because their core supporters, upper-caste Hindus, are 
so heavily represented within it.”297 And hereby, the stage for increasing violence was 
set. 
In sum, with the Ayodhya movement, the Hindu nationalist network used the 
institutional flaws of India’s political system and the favorable situation of a weak 
Congress to gain political advantages by mobilizing the masses and provoking violence 
between Hindus and Muslims. According to Brass, “It should be clear enough by now, 
therefore, how valuable Hindu-Muslim opposition, antagonism, and violence have been 
for the fortunes of the BJP.”298 
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C. THE KASHMIR CASE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE OF HINDU 
NATIONALISM 
1. Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict 
Due to the geographical situation of difficult accessibility to the region, Kashmir 
remained independent for a long period of time. In 1586, Kashmir was conquered by the 
Muslim ruler Akbar; was in 1756 a part of Afghanistan, and in 1819 a part of the Sikh 
Empire. In 1845, Kashmir was annexed by the British. Despite the Muslim majority, the 
British installed a Hindu ruler for the Kashmir region. 
After India’s independence, the future of Kashmir was not yet decided. Viceroy 
Mountbatten had planned a division of India but did not decide the future of Kashmir. 
During the partition phase of the Indian subcontinent, both countries, India and Pakistan, 
claimed the Kashmir area. Pakistan argued that a state with a Muslim majority had to 
belong to the Muslim country of Pakistan, whereas India claimed Kashmir with the 
argument that a Muslim majority could flourish in a secular India as well. As a result of 
this dispute, both countries refused to recognize the borders of the neighbor state and 
gave no guarantee for territorial integrity. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, 
denied accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan and hoped to keep Kashmir 
independent. “He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 15 August, the day of 
independence. He also offered such an agreement with India, but the Indian leaders 
prevaricated.”299 
However, beginning in June 1947, protests and secessionist movements (in 
Poonch province) started and led, in October 1947, to a revolt supported by Pakistan in 
the western part of Kashmir. In awareness of a defeat, Maharaja Hari Singh asked India 
for military support against the rebels. Even the National Conference of Kashmir which 
fought the rule of the Maharadja and opted initially for accession of Kashmir to Pakistan 
supported the resistance against the invaders from Pakistan. Kashmir’s Prime Minister, 
Sheik Mohammed Abdullah supported Maharaja Hari Singh in his efforts to preserve 
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Kashmir’s independence and reject Kashmir as being part of one of the two nations in 
South Asia.300 His political life is symbolic of the dilemma of the position of Kashmir 
and the Kashmirii people between Pakistan and India. Arrested by Maharaja Hari Singh, 
he later became his Prime Minister of Kashmir. In 1953, dismissed and again arrested, he 
was reprieved but later interned and exiled. In 1975, he became Chief Minister of Jammu 
and Kashmir. His hopes to build a bridge between India and Pakistan and to establish 
independence of Kashmir did not come true.301 
India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, promised support, yet attached the 
condition that Maharaja Hari Singh declare the accession of Kashmir to India and inform 
Governor General Lord Mountbatten.302 After Maharaja Hari Singh carried out this 
precondition, India sent troops to Kashmir and stopped the insurgencies. However, one 
third of the Kashmir territory was left in the hands of Pakistan. 
This first Kashmir War ended in 1949 after the United Nations was involved. As 
a result, Kashmir was divided along the cease fire line, later called the “Line of Control” 
(LOC) into a Pakistani part, called Azad Kashmir, and an Indian part, the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir can be divided into three regions, Jammu, 
the Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh. Each region is dominated by a different ethnic group. 
The bulk of the population lives in the Kashmir Valley which has a Muslim majority. 
Jammu is settled by a Hindu majority, but also includes a significant Muslim minority. 
Ladakh is sparsely populated and inhabited mainly by Buddhists. The overall majority in 
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Jammu and Kashmir are the Muslims. Against the agreement with the United Nations, 
Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from Azad Kashmir and India did not reduce its 
troops in Jammu and Kashmir. Likewise, the promised plebiscite of the Kashmirii people 
about the future of Kashmir was not held after the first Kashmir War. During the Sino-
Indian War in 1962, India lost a part of Jammu and Kashmir to China, called Aksai Chin. 
In the following period, the Kashmir dispute appeared several times on the agenda of the 
United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations. However, the dispute was 
not solved but escalated into new wars between India and Pakistan. 
In 1965/1966, India blamed Pakistan for supporting a rebellion in Jammu and 
Kashmir. This dispute developed into the Second Kashmir War which ended in 
September 1995 after intervention of the great powers and the United Nations. After 
mediation by the Soviet Union, both countries signed the Tashkent Declaration in 
January 1966. This treaty fixed the status quo ante bellum and committed both countries 
to not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, but did not solve the dispute behind the 
war. 
In the course of the The Bangladesh Liberation War, fighting between India and 
Pakistan occurred again in 1972, and also affected the area of Kashmir. It ended with the 
Pakistani surrender in East Pakistan and the founding of Bangladesh. In the Kashmir 
area, during the war, the Indian army gained some territory but ceded it after the war 
according to the Simla Agreement of July 1972. This agreement cemented the Line of 
Control (LOC) as a kind of a border between both countries in the Kashmir region. But 
the LOC did not clearly define the border in the area of the Siachen Glacier near the town 
of Kargil.303 
This resulting unclear border situation was a pretext for the Kargil War in 1999 
when the Pakistani military occupied Indian positions along the Kargil sector of the LOC. 
India reacted with massive use of regular Indian land and air forces and restored the 
situation as it had been prior to the war. Remarkable is that all wars between India and 
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Pakistan have been limited to the region and, as well, limited regarding the use of arms. 
Neither of the states has tried to escalate the war in order to defeat the opponent. 
Besides these wars, tensions were threatening to escalate towards renewed wars 
in 1987 (after the political unrest in India’s Punjab), 1990 (in the course of the turmoil in 
the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir) and in 2001/2002 (in the aftermath of an attack 
by terrorists on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001 and the attack on the 
military installation of Kaluchak on May 14, 2002). All these incidents led to belligerent 
rhetoric from both sides and to troop movements in the area of Kashmir. In the end, 
different reasons prevented a war and saved peace between India and Pakistan.304 
However, the dispute about Kashmir has involved India, Pakistan and China, three 
nuclear powers and made, according to the CIA, the area of Kashmir “… the site of the 
world’s largest and most militarized territorial dispute … .”305 
After the crisis of 2001/2002, India and Pakistan established measures to defuse 
the conflict between the two countries. The result was the announcement of a “composite 
dialogue” between the countries in January 2004. This dialogue maintained discussions to 
defuse the Kashmir conflict and the armed stand-off in the Siachen Glacier region. The 
dialogue has not solved the Kashmir problem, so far, but helped to find measures of 
confidence-building and to establish working groups to negotiate possible solutions for 
problems regarding the Kashmir region. 
One further dispute regarding the Kashmir area was the discussion about the 
construction of the Baglihar Dam by India and use of the water of the Chenab River. But 
this dispute was solved in 2007 by mediation of water experts of the World Bank. 
However, this indicated just another step, but not a solution, for the Kashmir conflict. 
“The concept of partition is anathema to Indians. Kashmir’s symbolism to India is as 
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critical a consideration as any security significance associated with this fragment of ice 
and rock threaded by a beautiful valley. India is unwilling to lose even one additional 
hectare of this land. New Delhi is also concerned that Kashmiri autonomy would set a 
precedent for breakaway movements in other Indian states (e.g., Punjab or Assam). To 
Pakistan, Kashmir is symbolic of its national ethos and commitment to protect Muslim 
interests against Indian encroachment. It believes that the creation of a separate, strongly 
sectarian nation is incomplete without contiguous Kashmir.”306 
2. Indian Policy Towards Kashmir 
Since India’s independence, India’s politics towards Kashmir have played a major 
role for Hindu nationalists. The partition of India and the foundation of Pakistan as a 
Muslim state strengthened the wish of Hindu traditionalists inside the Congress and 
Hindu nationalists to prove the loyalty of Indian Muslims to their country. The situation 
in Jammu and Kashmir became a symbol for the threat to India by Pakistan and the 
Muslims and offered the BJS the opportunity to challenge the Congress ruled government 
of India. According to Graham, “With his parliamentary role thus restricted, Mookerjee 
began to search outside Parliament for areas in which the government could be 
challenged, and he turned to the Kashmir dispute.”307  
He did so by supporting the agitations of the Praja Parishad, a political party in 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which refused the “Delhi Agreement” of July 1952 in 
which representatives of the Indian government and the government of Jammu and 
Kashmir agreed to most of the disputed matters about the status of Jammu and Kashmir. 
As did the Praja Parishad, the BJS supported the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir 
into India. But, according to Graham, these agitations created a failure for the BJS 
because “… it had given Nehru the ample opportunity to demonstrate that it was no 
different from other Hindu communalist organizations, for all its pretensions to be a 
progressive and a modern political force. Moreover, instead of strengthening its position 
in constitutional politics and extending a welcome to those Hindu traditionalists whom 
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the Congress no longer wanted, it had wasted its resources and its energies on a fruitless 
venture.”308 However, the pressure the BJS put on India’s government led at least partly 
to a shift in India’s official policy towards Jammu and Kashmir according to the BJS.309 
Officially, Article 370 of India’s Constitution offers the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir special autonomy rights,310 but the transfer to political practice withered from 
the beginning. De facto, the autonomy rights of the state of Jammu and Kashmir were 
little by little annulled and Jammu and Kashmir was integrated into India and controlled 
by the Indian government. “Most important, on 14 May 1954, Constitutional Order 1954 
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was issued which extended the power of the center over more than defense, 
communications, and foreign affairs. Over time, then, little was left of the special status 
of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.”311 According to Aijaz, India’s policy towards 
Kashmir was marked by a mixture of promises to the Kashmirii people, manipulation of 
elections and abuses of rights. “In practice, J&K has oscillated between military 
occupation and cynical manipulations of parliamentary governance, by the central 
governments as well as the local satraps.”312 This policy was dictated by the wish of the 
Indian government to keep the state of Jammu and Kashmir as a part of India and to 
prevent any kind of separatism. The result was not just the mentioned wars with 
neighboring countries, but violent struggles inside of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as 
well. 
The reasons for these struggles were diverse. On the one hand, it was India’s 
politics towards Kashmir; on the other hand it was Pakistan that stirred the separatists in 
Jammu and Kashmir and partly sparked the conflict towards an insurgency. At the 
beginning of the struggles, religious reasons were not decisive for resistance in Jammu 
and Kashmir, or for the request of the Kashmirii people for self-determination. It was 
more the desire to gain recognition as a region with vested autonomy rights that set the 
tone for the actions of the Kashmirii. 
Violent insurgencies gained momentum only after the 1987 elections. This 
election cast a shadow of fraud and violence especially against a new, Muslim-based, 
opposition coalition. Violence escalated in Jammu and Kashmir after the arrest of 
members of the Muslim opposition. Militant groups of Kashmirii people and Pakistan-
backed Islamist groups assassinated pro-Indian politicians and attacked government 
targets. These struggles were another reason for Pakistan to accuse India of violations of 
human rights and for India to accuse Pakistan of provoking the conflict in Jammu and 
Kashmir. With these mutual accusations, both sides were unable to use diplomatic means 
to work together to defuse the conflict. “By the mid-1990s, it was not only the most 
serious flashpoint in the region but also among the most likely accelerants for a nuclear 
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crisis anywhere on the globe. Thus, an internally driven crisis evolved into a regional 
security threat that also provides a political rallying point, particularly among nationalist 
groups who favor a more overt program of nuclear weapons acquisition.”313 
In 1990, the Indian government put Jammu and Kashmir under federal rule until 
1996 and used massive armed forces to suppress the insurgencies. The following period 
was marked by violence and rights abuses on both sides, the forces of the Indian 
government and the insurgency groups. This led to devastating numbers of casualties and 
further escalation of the conflict.314 Only after the 2002 election, which was seen as fair, 
was the way opened for negotiations with the various Kashmirii groups about the future 
of Jammu and Kashmir. The corrupt National Conference government was defeated and 
replaced by a coalition built of the Congress Party and the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). The negotiations were accompanied in 2004 by the announcement of a four-year 
$5 billion development package to improve infrastructure, education and tourism in the 
region. These means and the negotiations between the Indian government and the various 
Kashmirii groups neither led to a stable situation in Jammu and Kashmir, nor did they 
end the violence. Every crisis between India and Pakistan, such as the Mumbai attacks of 
2008, or an increase of violence in the region always rekindles the spiral of violence. 
However, the negotiations and additional confidence-building measures did lead to a 
decrease of violence and opened, in principle, the path for a peaceful solution of the 
problem.315 
The BJP position towards the Kashmir case was nearly unchanged in comparison 
to the BJS position of 1952. According to Austin, the party “… was opposed to any 
concessions in Kashmir, Punjab or Assam and was vehemently hostile to what it saw as 
the privileged position of the Muslim community.”316In its Election Manifesto of 1989, 
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the BJP blamed the Congress Government for the situation in Kashmir. “The Rajiv 
regime is bathed in blood and muck from head to foot, from Punjab to Assam and from 
Kashmir to Sri Lanka. Everything Rajiv Gandhi touches ends up in a bloody mess.”317 
The BJP solution for the Kashmir problem was “… setting up barbed wire fencing along 
the Indo-Bangladesh borders with Pakistan, effective and immediate measures to weed 
out the foreigners from Jammu Kashmir, Rajasthan and Gujarat.”318 
3. Explanations 
Various reasons led to the rigid position of India’s government towards the 
Kashmir case. The water resources of Kashmir and its function as a buffer zone were not 
decisive for India’s intransigent behavior towards the status of the state Jammu and 
Kashmir. Rather, it was the fear that territorial concessions could lead to a domino effect 
in other regions and challenge India’s integrity and territorial unity, which was decisive 
for the behavior of the Indian government. 
But these rational arguments were not exclusively decisive for the absence of a 
diplomatic solution of the Kashmir problem. Especially in 1952, and after 1971, a 
diplomatic solution seemed possible, but was prevented by the domestic situation in 
India. In case of any concessions, the Indian government had to deal with harsh reactions 
by the Hindu nationalists who exploited the case of Kashmir as a sign of weakness of the 
government. The example of India’s politics towards the Kashmir case shows how Hindu 
nationalists used an issue for domestic purposes, provoked tensions, and in the 1950s, 
forced the policy of the ruling Congress party into a more nationalistic direction. Hindu 
nationalists were able to make the status of Jammu and Kashmir (and Article 370) into a 
national issue of prestige for the Indians. Therefore, the status of Jammu and Kashmir 
was determined as a public matter. 
With this, India’s position was fixed by the position of Hindu nationalists and the 
Indian government was trapped by the Hindu nationalist position. The Indian government 
faced the contradiction between the formal status of Jammu and Kashmir and public 
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opinion driven by the Hindu nationalists. What Morgenthau argues in general, for any 
government, became especially true for the Indian government in the Kashmir case “It 
must resist the temptation to sacrifice what it considers good policy upon the altar of 
public opinion, abdicating leadership and exchanging short-lived political advantage for 
the permanent interest of the country. It must also avoid widening the unavoidable gap 
between the requirements of good foreign policy and the preferences of public 
opinion.”319 In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the Congress led government chose to 
support the Hindu nationalist position in order to gain popular support. Even more, the 
Hindu nationalistic agitation in 1952 and the constant threat by Hindu nationalists makes 
the Kashmir case an issue of Indian identity. “Kashmir, in brief, symbolizes the enmity 
that Hindus and Muslims harbor for one another.”320 
But, in fact, the initial causes for the conflict were less a primordial conflict 
between Hindus and Muslims than a conflict about inequality between ethnic groups. The 
rulers of Kashmir were Dogra Rajputs and occupied a majority of government posts. 
“Thus, while Muslims were at the bottom of the social hierarchy, Hindus such as 
Kashmirii Pandits were also less favored by the rulers.”321 Already, in 1931, a Muslim 
revolt against the feudal regime of the ruler took place but was based more on a conflict 
about social division in Kashmir and less about religion. After partition of India and 
Pakistan, “… identity politics seemed to dominate the struggle as it escalated to 
violence.”322 Again, one reason for this shift was the influence of the Hindu nationalists 
and their pressure on the Indian government. 
Therefore, regarding Kashmir, Hindu nationalists used the same means they used 
in the Ayodhya case. And, again, it was the weakness of the state which was decisive for 
the deterioration of the conflict and increasing violence in the 1980s. At the beginning of 
the conflict, it was the Indian constitution and the kind of separation of powers which 
made it possible that special rights for Jammu and Kashmir were undermined. “First, the 
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constitution is too easily amended. Second, the courts have too limited a jurisdiction vis-
à-vis the legislative / executive branch of the government.”323 Later on, the Indian 
government was pushed by the fear of losing control. Feeling threatened by its neighbor 
and forced by Hindu nationalists, the Indian government unintentionally provoked the 
resistance of the Kashmirii people. Chadda concludes: “Thus, in Punjab and Kashmir, the 
Congress’s progressive loss of control over its state units translated not only into the 
supranational State’s loss of relational control over India’s ethnonations, but also into 
India’s loss of relational control over its neighbor in foreign policy, and its growing 
vulnerability to superpower politics and the cold war.”324 In Jammu and Kashmir, the 
result was the transformation of the mostly peaceful protests into violent insurgencies, the 
increasing infiltration of Muslims from Pakistan, and the beginning of a spiral of 
violence. According to Ganguly “The insurgency stemmed from a process of political 
mobilization against a backdrop of institutional decay. … The insurgency’s immediate 
precipitant was the flawed state election of 1987.”325 Once the insurgency erupted 
“Pakistan’s involvement in the crisis has tipped the balance towards cultural (as opposed 
to class or ideological) conflict. Its support for Kashmir’s incorporation into Muslim 
Pakistan mobilized Kashmiri Hindus to struggle for incorporation into India.”326 
This development started parallel to the decline of the Congress-ruled government 
in the 1980s, but rose to a peak during the time of the Janata Dal led coalition (National 
Front) government from 1989 to 1990. This government was nearly incapable of 
cohesive policy because it included various coalition partners from left wing communists 
to the Hindu nationalistic BJP which made it difficult to find a common position for all 
coalition partners. The only possible politics of this weak government towards the  
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Kashmir case was the continuation of the politics of former governments. This meant 
continuing with a politics, based on a position made by pressure of Hindu nationalists, to 
ensure national integrity at any price.  
And, it was this weak government which had to face the challenges of the 
changing world order with its consequences for the region. Against this background, it 
was impossible for the Indian government to respond with vigor and confidence to the 
developments in Jammu and Kashmir. In sum, the weakness of the Indian state led in the 
1980s to a loss of India’s position as a regional major power and to an increase of 
domestic problems with increasing factionalism and separatist movements as in Punjab 
and Assam.327 
The Hindu nationalists used this weakness to strengthen their own domestic 
position. Yet, in contrast to the Ayodhya case, the Hindu nationalists did not need to 
provoke a strong Indian position regarding Jammu and Kashmir. For them, it was 
sufficient to ensure the continuation of India’s policy since independence. Corbridge 
gives one example for this when in 1990 “… many Hindus were forced to leave the Vale 
of Kashmir. The BJP played the anti-Muslim card in response to the Kashmir uprising, 
and gained further support from high-caste Indians opposed to the pro-reservations 
agenda of the National Front government (1989-91).”328 The BJP claimed that the 
population of the Hindu dominated parts of Jammu and Ladakh was discriminated against 
by the Muslim dominated part of Kashmir and, in addition to this, threatened by 
infiltrating terrorists trained in Pakistan. These factors created, in the BJP’s opinion, an 
anti-India atmosphere in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and threatened India’s 
sovereignty. Therefore, the BJP demanded stronger action by the Indian government 
against the secessionist movement in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and against their 
Pakistani supporters. 
One of the reasons why the government had not acted with the proper strength the 
BJP desired is found in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which guaranteed the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir special autonomy rights. Thus, the BJP opposed Article 370 of 
                                                 
327 See: Chadda, Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India, 286. 
328 Corbridge, ‘the Militarization of all Hindudom’? The Bharatiya Janata Party, the Bomb, and the 
Political Spaces of Hindu Nationalism, 234. 
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the Indian Constitution.329 According to Mailik, the Hindu nationalists argue officially 
that Article 370 “… was only a temporary arrangement, and it creates a psychological 
barrier between the people of India and Kashmir.”330 But, in practice, even when this 
barrier existed, it was caused by the Indian politics of the past towards the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. As shown, Article 370 had withered in practice since India’s foundation for 
different reasons and the demand for withdrawal of Article 370 was, for the BJP, nothing 
else than a kind of loyalty test for the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. 
But, the Kashmir case was not just a domestic issue of demonstrating power by 
mobilizing masses. Rather, it was an international issue involving Pakistan, China and the 
United Nations. Besides the policy of Pakistan and China, it was as well the then rigid 
position of India which prevented a diplomatic solution of the Kashmir problem, led to 
the Kashmir Wars and the awakening of “ethnic terrorism”331 in the region. 
                                                 
329 See Ahuja, BJP and the Indian Politics, 206-217. In addition, Ibid, 304-305 cited a BJP pamphlet: 
“The ruling party remains chronically unable and unwilling to insulate issues of national unity from 
considerations of petty political or electoral advantages and lacks courage to do its obvious duties like 
abolition of the ‘temporary’ provision of Article 370.” For further information about the BJP position 
towards the Punjab problem see Ibid., 218-235, to the Assam problem, see Ibid, 236-242, to the Tamil 
Nadu see Ibid., 251-258. The book is written by a supporter of the BJP. 
330 Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party, 122. 
331 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, 482. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The examination of the development of the BJP’s behavior over time and its 
behavior in two cases show that the BJP acted as the theoretical statements about party 
politics predicted. On basis of a strong ideology, embedded in a powerful network of 
collateral organizations, the BJP tried to change the identity of India’s nation-state in the 
sense of Hindutva. The Ayodhya campaign was an example of how Hindu nationalists 
tried to establish their view of the Hindu nation-state. The Kashmir case shows how 
successful Hindu nationalists can influence India’s policy by influencing public opinion 
and putting pressure on the government. 
However, the BJP was not able to change India’s national identity. Even if large 
parts of Indian society were prone to adopt the Hindu nationalistic point of view, the 
BJP’s overall attempt to change India’s identity was not successful. In the short run, the 
Ayodhya campaign was a success for the BJP, but the aftermath of the campaign showed 
the limits of any attempt to change India’s national identity. Although India has changed 
its basic economic orientation and today plays another role in international politics, it is 
still a secular and tolerant democracy based on the thoughts of Gandhi and Nehru. 
After recognizing that the chances of identity change for the entire Indian society 
were limited, the BJP showed a remarkable sense of pragmatism and instinct for the 
reachable in practical politics. After Ayodhya, it acted less as a social movement but 
more as a political party which had learned its lessons. It developed the ability to position 
itself as a responsible political force and centrist alternative to the Congress, without 
denying or losing its core party identity. Thus, the BJP did not change the basic 
orientation of the party, but allowed it to reach compromises and build coalitions. 
Tactical shifts, a moderate rhetoric and different strategies in different states were 
decisive for the success of the BJP in building coalitions. The BJP used the features of 
India’s federal system and the trend towards factionalism to present the party to the 
electorate with different images. In the Hindu heartland, the BJP is still a strong Hindu 
nationalistic party with strong ties to the Sangh Parivar. Here, the BJP has been able to 
impose its nationalistic agenda, up to a certain extent, on practical politics. Outside the 
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Hindu heartland, it presents itself as a strong party based on moderate Hindu nationalism 
and as a centrist alternative to the Congress. In these states Hindu nationalism has been 
reduced to a kind of Hindu-conservatism. This dual strategy gave the BJP the opportunity 
to gain ground even in the states outside of the Hindu heartland. Thus, India’s federalism 
and the trend to factionalism forced the BJP to adapt the party’s behavior in order to play 
a major role in Indian politics. 
But, it was as well these factors which prevented a shift towards a Hindu 
nationalistic policy on the national level when the BJP was in power to rule India. The 
diversity of India’s society is mirrored in the division of the Lok Sabha. The necessity of 
coalition building hampered imposing an extremistic policy. The BJP was dependent on 
coalition partners and only able to impose a nationalistic position in cases where it found 
common ground in society. The test of nuclear bombs in 1998 and the Kargil War in 
1999 were such incidents when a strong nationalistic policy of the BJP government could 
rely on the support of the majority of the population. But again, any further attempt to 
misuse this favourable situation in order to impose Hindu nationalistic positions (e.g., to 
win back the territory of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan during the first Kashmir War) 
would have eroded this base of supporters and have led to a split of the coalition. The 
election results of 2004 showed how changeable the electorate in India is. 
Currently, it is unlikely that the BJP and the Sangh Parivar will be successful in 
changing India’s national identity towards Hindutva. But, the fragmentation of the Indian 
party system with its permanent change in party coalitions might harm the Indian’s belief 
in the power of democracy. In the long run, it may lead to the desire for a strong national 
leadership and an unambiguous political direction without dependence on constantly 
changing smaller allies. This might be the chance for the BJP to gain power again. If the 
BJP maintains success with its strategy to present itself as a responsible centrist 
alternative to the Congress, under strong leadership with a clear program to lead India to 
greatness, it will be an alternative for voters who are disappointed in India’s political 
system of today. 
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Intentionally or not, during its time of ruling India, the BJP twice demonstrated 
the unifying character of strong leadership. First, in May 1998, after testing India’s 
nuclear bombs, public support for the BJP was at its peak, and second, in 1999 after 
winning the Kargil War. In both cases, the BJP was able to cover domestic problems by 
showing strength in foreign affairs. And, in both cases, the BJP used military power to 
unify India’s population and ensure support for its policy. Keeping these examples in 
mind, it is doubtful whether a BJP led government will act in the future as responsibly as 
India’s government acted 1999 when it ended the Kargil War without sending troops 
across the border to the Pakistani occupied part of Kashmir. 
Thus, to rely just on India’s federalism and on the population’s deeply grounded 
belief in liberal democracy as a means to prevent a shift towards Hindutva is not 
sufficient. The BJP and the Sangh Parivar demonstrated that they are able to use any 
opportunity of weakness of their opponents to gain their own advantages. In particular, a 
weak Indian state and weak state institutions are causes of worry. As long as secularism 
is not unambiguously rooted in the constitution and the principles of a tolerant nation-
state, in the sense of Gandhi, are not anchored in the constitution, the judicative will not 
have the power to protect the foundation of the Indian nation-state. This still offers Hindu 
nationalists the opportunity to use the terms “Hinduism” and “Hindutva” officially in the 
secular sense, but also subliminally, as a means to exclude parts of Indian society. 
Moreover, Hindu nationalists will have the chance to transfer Hindu nationalism into a 
new form of Indian nationalism, contrary to the ideas of Gandhi and Nehru. To prevent a 
future discussion about the national identity of India and avoid a development away from 
the ideas of Nehru and Gandhi, the Indian constitution has to be more unambiguous. 
Additionally, weak governmental institutions, in combination with a corrupt 
executive power (e.g., the police), favor the risk that Hindu nationalistic forces will have 
the chance to use any opportunity to exploit a favorable situation in order to impose 
elements of Hindu nationalistic policy in practice. Although it is, in the short run, 
unlikely that the BJP will change course again towards a strong Hindu nationalistic 
policy, it is wise to still watch the BJP with an “eagle eye.” It is still a political party 
based on Hindutva. And, as the examples of Ayodhya in 1992, Kargil in 1999 and 
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Gujarat in 2002 show, it would not hesitate to use all possible means to gain political 
advantages and impose Hindu nationalistic positions wherever and whenever possible. 
Finally, the fact that, for many of India’s political parties, ideological orientation 
is not as important for building a coalition or, more importantly, refusing an offer for 
coalition building, is also a cause of worry. If the desire for power is the overarching goal 
for political parties in India, and a Hindu nationalistic orientation is not a valid reason for 
the exclusion of coalition building, Hindu nationalism is then presentable and acceptable. 
Therefore, Hindu nationalism will not be rejected and the final goal of Hindu 
nationalism, a change of national identity, can be transferred into practical politics 
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